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Charter Detention and the Exclusion
of Evidence after Grant,
Harrison and Suberu
Jonathan Dawe and Heather McArthur*

I. INTRODUCTION
The quartet of judgments released by the Supreme Court of Canada
on July 17, 2009 — R. v. Grant, R. v. Suberu, R. v. Harrison and R. v.
Shepherd1 — are among the Court’s most important criminal law Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms2 decisions in recent years, making
major changes to the law governing the section 9 right against arbitrary
detention, the section 10(b) right to counsel, and the exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence under section 24(2). Most significantly,
Grant overturns 22 years of settled section 24(2) jurisprudence that
emphasized the importance of “trial fairness” and the principle against
self-incrimination. The Court has substantially modified the seminal
Collins test and effectively reversed its 1997 decision in R. v. Stillman,
where a majority held that unconstitutionally obtained and otherwise

*
Sack Goldblatt Mitchell LLP and McArthur Barristers. This paper has previously been
published in (2010) 56 Crim. L.Q. 376, and is reprinted with permission. An earlier version of this
paper appeared in the Criminal Lawyers’ Association (Ontario) newsletter, For the Defence, Vol. 30,
No. 4.
1
R. v. Grant, [2009] S.C.J. No. 32, 2009 SCC 32 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Grant”]; R. v.
Suberu, [2009] S.C.J. No. 33, 2009 SCC 33 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Suberu”]; R. v. Harrison, [2009]
S.C.J. No. 34, 2009 SCC 34 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Harrison”]; and R. v. Shepherd, [2009] S.C.J. No.
35, 2009 SCC 35 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Shepherd”]. One of the authors of this paper (JD) was counsel for the appellant in Grant and for the intervener Canadian Civil Liberties Association in
Harrison. Of the four cases, Grant serves as the lead judgment on the ss. 9 and 24(2) issues, while
Suberu is the lead judgment on s. 10(b). Suberu is also important as an example of the Court applying the Grant detention framework to its facts, while Harrison is important as an example of the
Court applying the new Grant s. 24(2) test to a case involving egregious police misconduct. Shepherd is the least significant of the new decisions, since the Court finds no Charter violation and does
not reach the s. 24(2) issue.
2
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
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undiscoverable conscriptive evidence “must be excluded”3 to preserve
the fairness of the trial. Grant thus opens the door to a considerable
amount of evidence that would have been excluded under the
Collins/Stillman approach now being ruled admissible. At the same time,
the Court’s decision in Harrison may give new teeth to the principle that
courts cannot be seen to condone serious police misconduct, since this
would send the message to the public that Charter rights are unimportant.
Grant also clarifies the meaning of detention under sections 9 and 10
of the Charter, although the majority muddies the waters when it applies
its new test to the facts of Suberu and surprisingly finds no detention.
The Court also holds for the first time that unlawful detentions are necessarily arbitrary and contravene section 9. With respect to the right to
counsel, Suberu establishes that a section 10(b) caution must be given
“immediately” after a detention crystallizes, reversing the Ontario Court
of Appeal’s holding in the decision on appeal that section 10(b) permits
“a brief interlude between the commencement of an investigative detention and the advising of the detained person’s right to counsel”.4 The
Supreme Court also holds that the duty to give a section 10(b) caution is
triggered by a Mann “investigative detention”, a point that was expressly
left open in Mann itself.5 Finally, Grant addresses the elements of the
Criminal Code’s “weapons trafficking” offences,6 reversing the trial
court and the Ontario Court of Appeal’s extremely broad interpretation of
“trafficking”. As interpreted by the Supreme Court, a person who merely
moves a weapon from place to place, without more, does not commit a
“weapons trafficking” offence.7
3
R. v. Stillman, [1997] S.C.J. No. 34, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607, at para. 122 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Stillman”].
4
R. v. Suberu, [2007] O.J. No. 317, 218 C.C.C. (3d) 27, at para. 50 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter
“Suberu (C.A.)”].
5
R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59, at para. 22 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Mann”].
6
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 99 (“weapons trafficking”) and s. 100 (“possession for purpose of weapons trafficking”). Both sections rely on the definition of “transfer” in s. 84.
7
Mr. Grant was convicted at trial of the s. 100(1) Criminal Code offence of “possession for
the purpose of weapons trafficking”, which makes it an offence for a person to possess a firearm for the
purpose of unlawfully “transferring” it. Section 84 defines “transfer” to mean “sell, provide, barter,
give, lend, rent, send, transport, ship, distribute or deliver”. On a literal reading of this definition, a
person who merely moves a gun from one place to another could be said to “transport” it, and thus
“transfer” it within the meaning of ss. 84, 99 and 100. Mr. Grant was convicted at trial on the basis that
he had “transported” the gun within the meaning of ss. 84 and 100 by carrying it while walking down
the street, and his conviction was upheld by the Ontario Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court of Canada
unanimously disagreed with the broad interpretation adopted by the trial judge and the Court of Appeal,
concluding (supra, note 1, at para. 144) that “Parliament did not intend s. 100(1) to address the simple movement of a firearm from one place to another”, or impose a substantial mandatory minimum
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II. DETENTION AND SECTIONS 9 AND 10
1. The Meaning of Detention: R. v. Grant
In one of its earliest Charter decisions, R. v. Therens,8 the Supreme
Court of Canada held that the concept of detention in sections 9 and 10
of the Charter is not limited to physical restraint or legal compulsion.
Rather, as Le Dain J. explained (writing for the Court on this issue):
[I]t is not realistic, as a general rule, to regard compliance with a
demand or direction by a police officer as truly voluntary, in the sense
that the citizen feels that he or she has the choice to obey or not, even
where there is in fact a lack of statutory or common law authority for
the demand or direction and therefore an absence of criminal liability
for failure to comply with it. Most citizens are not aware of the precise
legal limits of police authority. Rather than risk the application of
physical force or prosecution for wilful obstruction, the reasonable
person is likely to err on the side of caution, assume lawful authority
and comply with the demand. The element of psychological
compulsion, in the form of a reasonable perception of suspension of
freedom of choice, is enough to make the restraint of liberty
involuntary. Detention may be effected without the application or threat
of application of physical restraint if the person concerned submits or
acquiesces in the deprivation of liberty and reasonably believes that the
choice to do otherwise does not exist.9

In Grant and Suberu, the Court revisits and expands on this holding.
(a) The Facts of Grant
One afternoon in November 2003, two plainclothes officers, Constable Worrell and Constable Forde, were on patrol in the Greenwood and
Danforth area of Toronto. They were not investigating any particular
sentence on people who simply move a firearm from one place to another without legal authorization.
The Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of ss. 99 and 100 offences accords with what was plainly
Parliament’s intent. The Code’s “weapons trafficking” provisions are structurally indistinguishable from
the “drug trafficking” provisions in the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19 and its
predecessor legislation. On a literal reading of the CDSA definition of “trafficking”, which also includes
the word “transport”, a person who walked down the street with a joint of marijuana in his or her pocket
could be convicted as a “drug trafficker”. For over 40 years Canadian courts have consistently avoided
this absurd result by construing the definition of “traffic” in a narrower, non-literal manner (see, e.g., R.
v. Harrington, [1963] B.C.J. No. 98, [1964] 1 C.C.C. 189, at 193-98 (B.C.C.A.)). Parliament would
have been aware of this jurisprudence and almost certainly intended the ss. 99 and 100 “trafficking”
offences to be interpreted similarly.
8
[1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Therens”].
9
Id., at 644.
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crime, and had no information that any crime had recently been committed. They noticed Donnohue Grant, an 18-year-old black male who was a
stranger to them, walking down the sidewalk. The officers said they became suspicious when they saw Mr. Grant “fidgeting with his coat” and
staring at them in an unusual manner. However, it was undisputed that
they had no grounds to lawfully arrest him or detain him for investigative
purposes.
Constable Worrell and Constable Forde directed a nearby uniformed
officer, Constable Gomes, to “have a chat” with Mr. Grant and “see
what’s up with him”. Constable Gomes left his vehicle and approached
Mr. Grant, directing him to “keep his hands in front of him” in plain
view. Mr. Grant complied, and Constable Gomes proceeded to question
him about where he was going, what he was doing, and whether he had
ever been arrested. This questioning lasted for approximately six minutes. About two minutes into this interrogation, Constable Worrell and
Constable Forde left their vehicle and joined Constable Gomes on the
sidewalk, standing behind him and blocking the sidewalk in the direction
Mr. Grant had been walking. When Constable Gomes asked whether Mr.
Grant “had anything on him that he shouldn’t”, Mr. Grant initially replied
“No,” but then admitted that he had “a small bag of weed” in his coat
pocket. Constable Gomes then asked “Is that it?” Mr. Grant hung his
head and replied: “Well, no.” After further questioning from Cst. Gomes,
Mr. Grant eventually admitted: “I have a firearm.” The three officers then
arrested and searched him, finding a loaded revolver in a waist pouch
under his coat and a small bag of marijuana in his coat pocket. When
Constable Worrell asked Mr. Grant why he had a gun, he replied that he
was “just dropping it off … up the road”. Mr. Grant was charged with a
variety of firearms offences, including the Criminal Code section
100(1)(a) offence of possession of a weapon “for the purpose of … transferring it”.10
(b) The Judgments Below
Mr. Grant’s defence at trial was primarily Charter based: he argued
that the police infringed his sections 8, 9 and 10(b) Charter rights when
they stopped and questioned him, and sought to have both his inculpatory
responses and the seized gun excluded under section 24(2). Since it was
undisputed that the police did not have sufficient grounds to lawfully
10

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. This count is discussed at footnote 7, supra.
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detain Mr. Grant before he answered their questions, the central issue
was whether he was “detained” for Charter purposes before he made his
inculpatory utterances. The trial judge concluded that Mr. Grant was not
detained, characterizing the police questioning as mere “chit chat”. The
Ontario Court of Appeal disagreed, concluding that Mr. Grant was arbitrarily detained during the initial questioning, in violation of his section 9
rights.11 The Court declined to address Mr. Grant’s argument that his section 10(b) Charter right was also infringed, in part because it was “an
open question” whether section 10(b) was triggered by an investigative
detention short of an arrest.12 The Ontario Court of Appeal went on to
admit the evidence under section 24(2).13
(c) The Supreme Court of Canada’s Detention Analysis
Mr. Grant appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, primarily on
the section 24(2) issue.14 In response, the Crown sought to uphold the
result in the court below by arguing that Mr. Grant’s section 9 rights had
not been infringed because he was not “detained” when he made his inculpatory admission. The Crown urged the Supreme Court to apply a
lower level of Charter scrutiny to “community-based policing”.
The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously concluded that Mr.
Grant was arbitrarily detained. Chief Justice McLachlin and Charron J.
wrote joint majority reasons,15 while Deschamps J. wrote a separate concurrence. Justice Binnie wrote separate reasons setting out his
disagreement with the majority’s approach to the detention issue, but he
agreed with the majority’s conclusion on the facts.16
The Chief Justice and Charron J. began their reasons by commenting
that “the existing jurisprudence on the issues of detention and exclusion
of evidence is difficult to apply and may lead to unsatisfactory results”,
and that the Court should thus “take a fresh look at the frameworks that
have been developed for the resolution of these two issues”.17 On the
detention issue, the majority acknowledged that “a generous, purposive
11

R. v. Grant, [2006] O.J. No. 2179, 209 C.C.C. (3d) 250 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Grant

(C.A.)”].
12

Id., at para. 31.
This issue is discussed in Section III, below.
He also challenged the Ontario Court of Appeal’s interpretation of s. 100 of the Criminal
Code (see footnote 7, supra).
15
LeBel, Fish and Abella JJ. concurring.
16
See Section II.1.d, infra.
17
Grant, supra, note 1, at para. 3.
13
14
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and contextual approach should be applied” to the interpretation of constitutional provisions,18 but cautioned that “[w]hile the twin principles of
purposive and generous interpretation are related and sometimes conflated, they are not the same.”19 The purpose of the right is the dominant
concern, while generosity of interpretation is subordinate to and constrained by the purpose. Thus, the language of sections 9 and 10 of the
Charter must be construed in a generous manner that “furthers, without
overshooting, its purpose”.20
The Grant majority noted that everyone in Canada enjoys a broad
right to liberty, both at common law and under section 7 of the Charter.
The broad purpose of section 9 is the protection of individual liberty,
both physical and mental, from unjustified state interference:
[Section] 9 guards not only against unjustified state intrusions upon
physical liberty, but also against incursions on mental liberty by
prohibiting the coercive pressures of detention and imprisonment from
being applied to people without adequate justification.21

The concept of detention must be interpreted in accordance with this
purpose, and with regard to the fact that detention triggers the section 10
Charter right to counsel, which is “designed to ensure that the person
whose liberty has been curtailed retains an informed and effective choice
whether to speak to state authorities, consistent with the overarching
principle against self-incrimination” and to “ensure that the person who
is under the control of the state be afforded the opportunity to seek legal
advice in order to assist in regaining his or her liberty”.22 The majority
noted that:
[W]hile the forms of interference s. 9 guards against are broadly
defined to include interferences with both physical and mental liberty,
not every trivial or insignificant interference with this liberty attracts
Charter scrutiny. To interpret detention this broadly would trivialize the
applicable Charter rights and overshoot their purpose. Only the
individual whose liberty is meaningfully constrained has genuine need
of the additional rights accorded by the Charter to people in that
situation.23

18
19
20
21
22
23

Id., at para. 15.
Id., at para. 17.
Id.
Id., at para. 20.
Id., at para. 22.
Id., at para. 26.
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The majority reaffirmed the holding in Therens that a detention for
sections 9 and 10 purposes can arise through either physical or psychological restraint. The Chief Justice and Charron J. identified two distinct
forms of “psychological detention”:
The first is where the subject is legally required to comply with a
direction or demand, as in the case of a roadside breath sample. The
second is where there is no legal obligation to comply with a restrictive
or coercive demand, but a reasonable person in the subject’s position
would feel so obligated.24

In the latter situation, the perceptions of a reasonable person must be
determined objectively, focusing “on the state conduct in the context of
the surrounding legal and factual situation, and how that conduct would
be perceived by a reasonable person in the situation as it develops”.25
However, the majority added:
While the test is objective, the individual’s particular circumstances
and perceptions at the time may be relevant in assessing the
reasonableness of any perceived power imbalance between the
individual and the police, and thus the reasonableness of any perception
that he or she had no choice but to comply with the police directive. To
answer the question whether there is a detention involves a realistic
appraisal of the entire interaction as it developed, not a minute parsing
of words and movements. In those situations where the police may be
uncertain whether their conduct is having a coercive effect on the
individual, it is open to them to inform the subject in unambiguous
terms that he or she is under no obligation to answer questions and is
free to go. It is for the trial judge, applying the proper legal principles
to the particular facts of the case, to determine whether the line has
been crossed between police conduct that respects liberty and the
individual’s right to choose, and conduct that does not.26

In its prior decision in Mann, the Court (per Iacobucci J.) had held
that:
[T]he police cannot be said to “detain”, within the meaning of ss. 9 and
10 of the Charter, every suspect they stop for purposes of identification,
or even interview. The person who is stopped will in all cases be
“detained” in the sense of “delayed”, or “kept waiting”. But the
constitutional rights recognized by ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter are not
24
25
26

Id., at para. 30.
Id., at para. 31.
Id., at para. 32, see paras. 30-32.
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engaged by delays that involve no significant physical or psychological
restraint.27

The Grant majority reaffirmed this holding, noting that not all police-citizen interactions involving some physical delay or police
questioning will necessarily amount to a Charter detention. For example,
the Chief Justice and Charron J. stated:
In many common situations, reasonable people understand that the
police are not constraining individual choices, but rather helping people
or gathering information. For instance, the reasonable person would
understand that a police officer who attends at a medical emergency on
a 911 call is not detaining the individuals he or she encounters. This is
so even if the police in taking control of the situation, effectively
interfere with an individual’s freedom of movement. Such deprivations
of liberty will not be significant enough to attract Charter scrutiny
because they do not attract legal consequences for the concerned
individuals.28

Even when the police are investigating a crime, not every interaction
they have with a witness or potential suspect will necessarily give rise to
a detention:
In the context of investigating an accident or a crime, the police,
unbeknownst to them at that point in time, may find themselves asking
questions of a person who is implicated in the occurrence and,
consequently, is at risk of self-incrimination. This does not preclude the
police from continuing to question the person in the pursuit of their
investigation. Section 9 of the Charter does not require that police
abstain from interacting with members of the public until they have
specific grounds to connect the individual to the commission of a
crime. Nor does s. 10 require that the police advise everyone at the
outset of any encounter that they have no obligation to speak to them
and are entitled to legal counsel.
Effective law enforcement is highly dependent on the cooperation
of members of the public. The police must be able to act in a manner
that fosters this cooperation, not discourage it. However, police
investigative powers are not without limits. The notion of
psychological detention recognizes the reality that police tactics, even
in the absence of exercising actual physical restraint, may be coercive
enough to effectively remove the individual’s choice to walk away
from the police. This creates the risk that the person may reasonably
27
28

Mann, supra, note 5, at para. 19.
Grant, supra, note 1, at para. 36.
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feel compelled to incriminate himself or herself. Where that is the case,
the police are no longer entitled simply to expect cooperation from an
individual. Unless, as stated earlier, the police inform the person that he
or she is under no obligation to answer questions and is free to go, a
detention may well crystallize and, when it does, the police must
provide the subject with his or her s. 10(b) rights. That the obligation
arises only on detention represents part of the balance between, on the
one hand, the individual rights protected by ss. 9 and 10 and enjoyed by
all members of society, and on the other, the collective interest of all
members of society in the ability of the police to act on their behalf to
investigate and prevent crime.29

The majority acknowledged that “neighbourhood policing” could
sometimes raise “[a] more complex situation”, in which “the noncoercive police role of assisting in meeting needs or maintaining basic
order can subtly merge with the potentially coercive police role of investigating crime and arresting suspects”.30 In such cases, the focus can shift
from community-oriented concern to focused suspicion:
Focussed suspicion, in and of itself, does not turn the encounter in[to] a
detention. What matters is how the police, based on that suspicion,
interacted with the subject. The language of the Charter does not
confine detention to situations where a person is in potential jeopardy
of arrest. However, this is a factor that may help to determine whether,
in a particular circumstance, a reasonable person would conclude he or
she had no choice but to comply with a police officer’s request. The
police must be mindful that, depending on how they act and what they
say, the point may be reached where a reasonable person, in the
position of that individual, would conclude he or she is not free to
choose to walk away or decline to answer questions.31

The Grant majority summarized its conclusions as follows:
1.

Detention under ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter refers to a suspension
of the individual’s liberty interest by a significant physical or
psychological restraint. Psychological detention is established
either where the individual has a legal obligation to comply with
the restrictive request or demand, or a reasonable person would
conclude by reason of the state conduct that he or she had no
choice but to comply.

29

Id., at paras. 38-39.
Id., at para. 40.
Id., at paras. 40-41.

30
31
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In cases where there is no physical restraint or legal obligation, it
may not be clear whether a person has been detained. To determine
whether the reasonable person in the individual’s circumstances
would conclude that he or she had been deprived by the state of the
liberty of choice, the court may consider, inter alia, the following
factors:
a)

The circumstances giving rise to the encounter as would
reasonably be perceived by the individual: whether the
police were providing general assistance; maintaining
general order; making general inquiries regarding a
particular occurrence; or, singling out the individual for
focussed investigation.

b) The nature of the police conduct, including the language
used; the use of physical contact; the place where the
interaction occurred; the presence of others; and the
duration of the encounter.
c)

The particular characteristics or circumstances of the
individual where relevant, including age; physical stature;
32
minority status; level of sophistication.

The Grant majority also resolved the outstanding question of
whether an unlawful detention is necessarily “arbitrary” and contrary to
section 9. Some early Charter cases, notably the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in R. v. Duguay,33 had suggested that an unlawful
detention would not be “arbitrary” if it was not also “capricious” or “random”. The Grant majority rejected this approach, holding that section 9
should be interpreted to mirror the section 8 guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure:
[Under the s. 8 jurisprudence] a search must be authorized by law to be
reasonable; the authorizing law must itself be reasonable; and the
search must be carried out in a reasonable manner. Similarly, it should
now be understood that for a detention to be non-arbitrary, it must be
authorized by a law which is itself non-arbitrary.34

The majority noted that if a law permits arbitrary detentions, the resulting infringement of section 9 might be justified under section 1.35
32

Id., at para. 44.
[1985] O.J. No. 2492, 18 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.).
34
Grant, supra, note 1, at para. 56.
35
Id., at para. 56, citing R. v. Hufsky, [1988] S.C.J. No. 30, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 621 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Hufsky”] and R. v. Ladouceur, [1990] S.C.J. No. 53, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1257 (S.C.C.).
33
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(d) Justice Binnie’s Dissent
Although Binnie J. agreed that Mr. Grant was “detained”, he wrote
separate reasons expressing his disagreement with the majority’s detention analysis.36 In his view, the existence or non-existence of a Charter
detention should not depend solely on the perceptions of a reasonable
person in the subject’s shoes. Rather, he believed “more attention should
be paid to the objective facts of the encounter between a police officer
and members of the public, whether or not such facts are made apparent
to the person stopped”.37 These external facts would sometimes support
the conclusion that the subject was detained, and sometimes have the
opposite effect. Justice Binnie expressed concern that the majority’s detention test will be uncertain in its application, since so much depends on
the particular qualities attributed to the hypothetical reasonable person
placed in the subject’s position. He stated:
Insistence that the claimant’s circumstances be viewed from the more
detached perspective of a “reasonable person” provides in some cases a
welcome corrective, but in other cases, by exaggerating the ability of
ordinary people to stand up to police assertion of authority, that
approach may compel the conclusion that the claimant had the choice
to walk away whereas in reality no such choice existed.38

In his opinion, when viewed purely from the subject’s perspective a
great many police-citizen encounters would properly be seen as involving detentions, given “the Canadian reality” recognized in Therens that
most members of the public “will almost always regard a direction from
a police officer as a demand that must be complied with”.39 However,
Binnie J. believed such a broad conception of detention cannot be justified on a purposive approach to sections 9 and 10 of the Charter, since
many people who reasonably believe they are being detained by the police actually “do not reasonably require the assistance of counsel”.40
Conversely, “the device of putting in [the subject’s] place an artificially
robust and assertive ‘reasonable person’”41 can exclude cases where a
36
Justice Deschamps also wrote a separate concurrence in which she briefly addressed the
issue of detention on the facts of the case, agreeing with the majority and Binnie J. that Mr. Grant
was detained. Her concurrence focused on the s. 24(2) issue and her disagreement with the new
s. 24(2) framework adopted by the majority (discussed below in Section III).
37
Grant, supra, note 1, at para. 175, per Binnie J.
38
Id., at para. 166, per Binnie J.
39
Id., at para. 170, per Binnie J.
40
Id.
41
Id., at para. 169, per Binnie J.
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detention should be recognized on a purposive approach, because “the
liberty interest of the person stopped is truly at issue”.42 He observed:
This gap between the reality on the street and the court constructed
“reasonable person” is of particular relevance to visible minorities who
may, because of their background and experience, feel especially
unable to disregard police directions, and feel that assertion of their
right to walk away will itself be taken as evasive and later be argued by
the police to constitute sufficient grounds of suspicion to justify a
Mann detention.43

Justice Binnie concluded:
In the absence of explicit criteria, various judges will tend to read
into the “reasonable person” their own projections of the moment at
which, in their view, the person stopped ought to be able to call a
lawyer. This creates the risk of a very results-oriented analysis.
Perceptions will vary depending on the personality of the judge seized
with the case. My colleagues emphasize at different places the need for
deference to the assessment of the trial judges (e.g., para. 43) which
may further complicate the task of developing a consistent approach. In
other words, continued reliance on the “reasonable person” whose
attributed experience and choice of criteria are unspecified except for a
presumed commitment to “reasonableness” helps to mask rather than
clarify the actual criteria being applied by the Court.44

Further, in his opinion:
A central problem with the … claimant-centred approach … is that
it does not take adequately into account what the police know and when
they knew it except insofar as this information is conveyed to the
person stopped, but which the police may not consider to be in their
interest to convey. Police may know … if a crime has allegedly been
committed and whether they are making the approach to an individual
with a view to obtaining general information or, on the other hand,
corralling a suspect and collecting admissible evidence to bring him or
her to justice. Possession of such knowledge may in fact place the
police in an adversarial relationship to the person approached whether
that person is aware of the jeopardy or not. It is the adversarial
relationship together with the “stop” that generates the need for
counsel. At that point, the power imbalance is significant. The
unsuspecting suspect may fatally compromise his or her position
42
43
44

Id., at para. 155, per Binnie J.
Id., at para. 169, per Binnie J.
Id., at para. 174, per Binnie J. (emphasis in original).
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simply through ignorance of his or her rights and the fact the police
have now adopted an adversarial position. At that point, as Le Dain J.
put it in Therens, “a person may reasonably require the assistance of
counsel” (pp. 641-42), but may not have any idea of the perilous turn of
events.45

2. Section 10(b): R. v. Suberu
The rights in section 10 of the Charter are guaranteed to “[e]veryone
… on arrest or detention”. In Hufsky,46 the Court held that detention has
the same meaning in sections 9 and 10. However, in R. v. Mann the Court
raised the possibility that not every section 9 Charter detention would
necessarily trigger the full panoply of section 10 rights. Mann recognized
a common law power authorizing the police to conduct brief “investigative detentions”, based on a standard of reasonable suspicion. The Court
held that persons detained pursuant to this power must “[a]t a minimum
… be advised, in clear and simple language, of the reasons for the detention,” as required by s. 10(a).47 However, the Court (per Iacobucci J.)
declined to address whether these detainees must also be advised of their
section 10(b) rights, stating:
Section 10(b) of the Charter raises more difficult issues. It enshrines the
right of detainees “to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to
be informed of that right”. Like every other provision of the Charter, s.
10(b) must be purposively interpreted. Mandatory compliance with its
requirements cannot be transformed into an excuse for prolonging,
unduly and artificially, a detention that, as I later mention, must be of
brief duration. Other aspects of s. 10(b), as they arise in the context of
investigative detentions, will in my view be left to another day. They
should not be considered and settled without the benefit of full
consideration in the lower courts, which we do not have in this case.48

Subsequently, in R. v. Orbanski,49 a majority of the Court held that
motorists detained under a provincial highway traffic statute did not have
to be advised of their section 10(b) rights, holding that the statute contained an implied exemption from the section 10(b) informational duties
that could be justified under section 1.
45
46
47
48
49

Id., at para. 178, per Binnie J.
Supra, note 35, at 632.
Mann, supra, note 5, at para. 21.
Id., at para. 22.
R. v. Orbanski; R. v. Elias, [2005] S.C.J. No. 37, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.).
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Accordingly, when Grant and Suberu were argued there was some
uncertainty surrounding the exact relationship between section 9 “detentions” and the police informational duties in section 10(b).50 The section
10(b) Charter issue appeared to have more practical significance in
Suberu than in Grant, and the two appeals were argued on this basis.51
The Court made its judgment in Suberu the lead decision on the section
10(b) issue, although it rather surprisingly proceeded to decide the
Suberu appeal itself on the basis that the defendant was not detained —
an issue the Crown had conceded in every level of court.
(a) The Facts of Suberu
Mr. Suberu and another man used a stolen credit card to purchase
items from several stores, including gift certificates from a liquor store.
Later that day, the other man tried to use one of these certificates to buy
beer at a different liquor store in a nearby town. The store staff knew
about the earlier fraudulent gift certificate purchase and called the police.
Constable Roughley responded to the call, and was advised by another
officer that there were two male suspects in the store. When he entered
the store, he saw the other officer speaking with a male customer. Mr.
Suberu left the store, saying to Constable Roughley as he walked past:
“He did this, not me, so I guess I can go.” Constable Roughly followed
Mr. Suberu outside, and as he was getting into his vehicle told him:
“Wait a minute. I need to talk to you before you go anywhere.” He proceeded to question Mr. Suberu about who he was and what he was doing.
While he was doing so, he received a radio report advising that the men
who had used the stolen credit card earlier in the day had been driving
the vehicle in which Mr. Suberu was now sitting. Constable Roughley
asked Mr. Suberu to produce identification and vehicle registration
50
Section 10(b) gives detainees “the right to retain and instruct counsel without delay and
to be informed of that right”. This latter informational duty has been interpreted as requiring the
police to advise detainees of the existence and availability of free legal advice from duty counsel,
and the means by which this advice can be obtained immediately (see R. v. Brydges, [1990] S.C.J.
No. 8, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 190 (S.C.C.); R. v. Bartle, [1994] S.C.J. No. 74, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 173
(S.C.C.)).
51
The central issue in Grant was whether Mr. Grant had been detained; if he was, it was
undisputed that this detention was arbitrary and contrary to s. 9, and it was a secondary issue
whether his s. 10(b) rights were also infringed. In contrast, in Suberu the Crown conceded a detention, but the defence conceded that it was authorized by Mann and did not violate s. 9. Accordingly,
the parties in Suberu both approached the case as turning on the s. 10(b) Charter issue. A number of
interveners participated in both appeals, which were heard a few weeks apart making their submissions on s. 10(b) in Suberu and using Grant to address ss. 9 and 24(2).
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papers. As Mr. Suberu was locating these documents, the officer noticed
bags in the vehicle from some of the stores where the stolen credit card
had been used. At this point, he arrested Mr. Suberu for fraud and advised him for the first time of his right to counsel.
(b) Proceedings in the Courts Below
At trial, Mr. Suberu argued that he had been detained at the point that
the officer told him to “wait” and began questioning him, and that the
officer should at that point have advised him of his section 10(b) rights.
The trial judge agreed that there was a “momentary investigative detention”, but held that the officer was not obliged to inform Mr. Suberu of
his right to counsel before asking him preliminary exploratory questions.
The summary conviction appeal court held that Mann “investigative detentions” do not engage section 10(b). Mr. Suberu appealed further to the
Ontario Court of Appeal. Justice Doherty, writing for the Court of Appeal, agreed that Mr. Suberu had been “detained” (as the Crown had
conceded, both in the Court of Appeal and in the courts below), and held
that “investigative detentions” do trigger section 10(b). However, he interpreted the words “without delay” in section 10(b) as permitting a brief
period at the beginning of an investigative detention during which the
officer may ask exploratory questions to determine whether a lengthier
detention is required, before informing the detainee of his or her right to
counsel. He concluded that applying this standard to the facts of Suberu,
there was no section 10(b) violation.
The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously52 rejected the summary
conviction appeal court’s holding that section 10(b) is not triggered by
“investigative detentions”, and also rejected Doherty J.A.’s interpretation
of the term “without delay” in section 10(b). Noting that Mann had left
open the question of “whether the police duty to inform an individual of
his or her section 10(b) Charter right to retain and instruct counsel is
triggered at the outset of an investigative detention”, the Court held:
It is our view that this question must be answered in the affirmative.
The concerns regarding compelled self-incrimination and the
interference with liberty that s. 10(b) seeks to address are present as
soon as a detention is effected. Therefore, from the moment an
52
Chief Justice McLachlin and Charron J. wrote joint reasons in Suberu, joined by LeBel,
Deschamps and Abella JJ. Justice Binnie and Fish J. dissented in the result but agreed with the majority on the s. 10(b) issue.
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individual is detained, s. 10(b) is engaged and, as the words of the
provision dictate, the police have the obligation to inform the detainee
of his or her right to counsel “without delay”.

Further, the Court found Doherty J.A.’s interpretation of the term “without delay” to be inconsistent with a purposive interpretation of section
10, stating:
A situation of vulnerability relative to the state is created at the
outset of a detention. Thus, the concerns about self-incrimination and
the interference with liberty that s. 10(b) seeks to address are present as
soon as a detention is effected. In order to protect against the risk of
self-incrimination that results from the individuals being deprived of
their liberty by the state, and in order to assist them in regaining their
liberty, it is only logical that the phrase “without delay” must be
interpreted as “immediately”. If the s. 10(b) right to counsel is to serve
its intended purpose to mitigate the legal disadvantage and legal
jeopardy faced by detainees, and to assist them in regaining their
liberty, the police must immediately inform them of the right to counsel
as soon as the detention arises.
To allow for a delay between the outset of a detention and the
engagement of the police duties under s. 10(b) creates an ill-defined
and unworkable test of the application of the s. 10(b) right. The right to
counsel requires a stable and predictable definition. What constitutes a
permissible delay is abstract and difficult to quantify, whereas the
concept of immediacy leaves little room for misunderstanding. An illdefined threshold for the application of the right to counsel must be
avoided, particularly as it relates to a right that imposes specific
obligations on the police. In our view, the words “without delay” mean
“immediately” for the purposes of s. 10(b). Subject to concerns for
officer or public safety, and such limitations as prescribed by law and
justified under s. 1 of the Charter, the police have a duty to inform a
detainee of his or her right to retain and instruct counsel, and a duty to
facilitate that right immediately upon detention.53

The Court also declined to adopt the Crown’s suggestion and create a
common law rule suspending section 10(b) duties during investigative detentions, holding that no case had been made out for justifying such a
general suspension of rights under section 1.54 Rather, the Court suggested
53

Suberu, supra, note 1, at paras. 41-42.
The Court thus declined to address the argument made by the appellant and several interveners that a law suspending s. 10(b) would survive s. 1 scrutiny only if it provided the detainee with
use immunity in relation to any statements made before a s. 10(b) caution was provided.
54
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that a general suspension was unnecessary having regard to “the purposive approach to detention taken in Grant”:
Because the definition of detention, as understood in these reasons,
gives the police leeway to engage members of the public in noncoercive, exploratory questioning without necessarily triggering their
Charter rights relating to detention, s. 1 need not be invoked in order to
allow the police to effectively fulfill their investigative duties.55

3. The Majority’s Detention and Section 10(b) Tests Applied: Grant
and Suberu
Applying its analytic framework for determining the existence of a
detention to the facts in Grant, the majority found that Mr. Grant was
detained:
Although Cst. Gomes was respectful in his questioning, the
encounter was inherently intimidating. The power imbalance was
obviously exacerbated by Mr. Grant’s youth and inexperience. Mr.
Grant did not testify, so we do not know what his perceptions of the
interaction actually were. However, because the test is an objective one,
this is not fatal to his argument that there was a detention. We agree
with Laskin J.A.’s conclusion that Mr. Grant was detained. In our view,
the evidence supports Mr. Grant’s contention that a reasonable person
in his position (18 years old, alone, faced by three physically larger
policemen in adversarial positions) would conclude that his or her right
to choose how to act had been removed by the police, given their
conduct.
The police conduct that gave rise to an impression of control was
not fleeting. The direction to Mr. Grant to keep his hands in front, in
itself inconclusive, was followed by the appearance of two other
officers flashing their badges and by questioning driven by focussed
suspicion of Mr. Grant. The sustained and restrictive tenor of the
conduct after the direction to Mr. Grant to keep his hands in front of
him reasonably supports the conclusion that the officers were putting
him under their control and depriving him of his choice as to how to
respond.
We conclude that Mr. Grant was detained when Cst. Gomes told
him to keep his hands in front of him, the other two officers moved into
position behind Cst. Gomes, and Cst. Gomes embarked on a pointed
55

Suberu, supra, note 1, at para. 45.
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line of questioning. At this point, Mr. Grant’s liberty was clearly
constrained and he was in need of the Charter protections associated
with detention.56

Although Binnie J. disagreed with the majority’s approach to the detention issue, he agreed with this conclusion, as did Deschamps J. in her
separate concurrence. Since it was undisputed that any detention of Mr.
Grant was unlawful and arbitrary, the Court unanimously found a breach
of his section 9 Charter rights. It was undisputed that the police had not
advised Mr. Grant of his right to counsel. Applying its holding in Suberu,
the Court also found a section 10(b) violation.57
In Suberu, on the other hand, the majority found that the defendant
had not been detained prior to his arrest, notwithstanding that the Crown
had conceded throughout the proceedings that he was detained, a concession all of the courts below accepted.58 In the majority’s view:
... As a whole, the circumstances of the encounter support a reasonable
perception that Constable Roughley was orienting himself to the
situation rather than intending to deprive Mr. Suberu of his liberty.59

According to the majority, the exchange between Constable Roughley and Mr. Suberu, during which Mr. Suberu asked if he could leave and
Constable Roughley replied that he could not, was ambiguous:
In the context, these words admit more than one interpretation. They
might be understood as, “I need to talk to you to get more information”.
They might also be construed as an order not to leave, suggestive of
putting Mr. Suberu under police control. In interpreting these words, it
is relevant to note that Constable Roughley made no move to obstruct
Mr. Suberu’s movement. He simply spoke to him as he sat in his van.
Further, while the exact duration of the encounter is not clear on the
record, it was characterized by the Court of Appeal as a “very brief
dialogue” (para. 17). Taken as a whole, the conduct of the officer
viewed objectively supports the trial judge’s view that what was

56

Grant, supra, note 1, at paras. 50-52.
As discussed below, the Court went on to admit the evidence against Mr. Grant under
s. 24(2). See Section III, infra.
58
The trial judge in Suberu expressly found that there had been an “investigative detention”, but held (for reasons not fully explained) that the police nevertheless did not have to advise
Mr. Suberu of his s. 10(b) rights. According to the Suberu majority, the trial judge’s conclusion that
there was no s. 10(b) violation “effectively determined as a question of law that there had been no
detention before the time of arrest”, thus allowing the Court to revisit the detention issue (Suberu,
supra, note 1, at para. 19).
59
Id., at para. 32.
57
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happening at this point was preliminary questioning to find out whether
to proceed further.60

Although neither Mr. Grant nor Mr. Suberu testified on their respective Charter voir dires, in Grant the Court held that this was “not fatal” to
Mr. Grant’s detention argument, since the detention analysis was ultimately objective. In Suberu, however, the majority placed considerable
emphasis on the fact that Mr. Suberu had not himself given evidence.61
Justices Binnie and Fish dissented, holding that the facts of Suberu
gave rise to a detention under the Grant majority’s test. In Binnie J.’s
view, the exchange between the officer and Mr. Suberu “clearly established an unambiguous police order”:
Constable Roughley’s words were only ambiguous if one ignores the
preceding remark from Mr. Suberu. Constable Roughley was replying
to Mr. Suberu, who had essentially said, “Can I leave?”, by essentially
saying, “No”. It was clear to Mr. Suberu that he was not free to go
“anywhere” and any reasonable person in that position would have
come to the same conclusion. At that point there was, within the
meaning of the test in Grant, a detention, in my view, which was
unsupported at that stage by any grounds of reasonable suspicion as
required by R. v. Mann …. My colleagues point out correctly that
Constable Roughley did not try physically to obstruct Mr. Suberu’s
movement but that is why this is a case of psychological, not physical,
detention.62

In his view, “[i]f a finding of detention in these circumstances produces an anomalous result then a re-examination of the claimant-centred
test is warranted.”63 Justice Binnie suggested that Suberu may be “one of
the cases where taking into account the police perspective — even
though it was unknown to Mr. Suberu — might have strengthened the
Crown’s case”.64 Justice Fish wrote his own brief dissenting reasons explaining that he agreed with the Grant majority’s test for detention but
agreed with Binnie J.’s application of this test to the facts of Suberu.65

60
61
62
63
64
65

Id., at para. 33.
Id., at paras. 32 and 34.
Id., at para. 56, per Binnie J. (dissenting) (emphasis in orginal; citation omitted).
Id., at para. 58, per Binnie J. (dissenting).
Id., at para. 59, per Binnie J. (dissenting).
Id., at para. 65, per Fish J. (dissenting).
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4. Analysis
On its face, the Grant majority’s section 9 analytic framework is not
radically different from the tests arising out of the earlier Charter detention jurisprudence. Before Grant, one of leading cases on the factors to
be considered when assessing whether or not there was a detention was
the Ontario Court of Appeal’s 1987 decision in R. v. Moran,66 in which
Martin J.A. set out a non-exhaustive list of seven relevant considerations:
1.

The precise language used by the police officer in requesting the
person who subsequently becomes an accused to come to the
police station, and whether the accused was given a choice or
expressed a preference that the interview be conducted at the
police station, rather than at his or her home;

2.

whether the accused was escorted to the police station by a police
officer or came himself or herself in response to a police request;

3.

whether the accused left at the conclusion of the interview or
whether he or she was arrested;

4.

the stage of the investigation, that is, whether the questioning was
part of the general investigation of a crime or possible crime or
whether the police had already decided that a crime had been
committed and that the accused was the perpetrator or involved in
its commission and the questioning was conducted for the purpose
of obtaining incriminating statements from the accused;

5.

whether the police had reasonable and probable grounds to believe
that the accused had committed the crime being investigated;

6.

the nature of the questions: whether they were questions of a
general nature designed to obtain information or whether the
accused was confronted with evidence pointing to his or her guilt;

7.

the subjective belief by an accused that he or she is detained,
although relevant, is not decisive, because the issue is whether he
or she reasonably believed that he or she was detained. Personal
circumstances relating to the accused, such as low intelligence,
emotional disturbance, youth and lack of sophistication are
circumstances to be considered in determining whether he had a
subjective belief that he was detained.67

66

[1987] O.J. No. 794, 36 C.C.C. (3d) 225 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Moran”].
Id., at 258-59.

67
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Moran involved a police station interview, and some of the Moran
factors are specific to this particular context. However, later cases had
adapted the Moran factors to better fit other situations, including policecitizen street encounters. Most of the specific factors listed in Grant majority’s three-prong detention test have direct counterparts in Moran.68
However, the two sets of factors are not completely identical. For instance, the Grant majority supplements the list of personal attributes
listed in the seventh Moran branch by adding “physical stature” and
“minority status” as relevant considerations. Justice Binnie’s concurring
reasons (dissenting on the legal framework, but concurring in the result)
are also sensitive to the issue of race, noting:
A growing body of evidence and opinion suggests that visible
minorities and marginalized individuals are at particular risk from
unjustified “low visibility” police interventions in their lives. … The
appellant, Mr. Grant, is black. Courts cannot presume to be colourblind in these situations.69

The majority and Justice Binnie’s frank and express recognition of
race as a relevant consideration in the detention analysis is a welcome
development.
As Binnie J. points out in his dissent, the majority’s “claimantcentred” test appears to ignore the fourth and fifth Moran factors, to the
extent that they involve matters unknown to the claimant. However, it is
important to note that the Grant factors are not necessarily exhaustive,
and are specifically presented as bearing on the issue of psychological
detention. If the police have formed reasonable and probable grounds to
arrest a suspect and have decided to physically stop the suspect if he or
she tries to leave, it remains at least arguable that the suspect is physically detained at this point, even if he or she remains ignorant of the
detention for some further period.

68
For instance, the factors in part 2(a) of the Grant framework are substantially similar to
those in the fourth Moran branch, the part 2(b) factors have analogues in the first and sixth Moran
branches, while most of the part 2(c) factors can be found in the seventh branch of Moran.
69
Grant, supra, note 1, at para. 154, per Binnie J. (citations omitted), citing R. v. Golden,
[2001] S.C.J. No. 81, 2001 SCC 83, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 679, at para. 83 (S.C.C.); A. Young, “All Along
the Watchtower: Arbitrary Detention and the Police Function” (1991) 29 Osgoode Hall L.J. 329, at
390; D.M. Tanovich, “Using the Charter to Stop Racial Profiling: The Development of an EqualityBased Conception of Arbitrary Detention” (2002) 40 Osgoode Hall L.J. 145; Ontario Human Rights
Commission, Inquiry Report, Paying the Price: The Human Cost of Racial Profiling (2003); Report
of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System (1995), at 337.
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At several points in its judgment, the Grant majority notes that the
police will sometimes be able to prevent a detention from crystallizing
by specifically informing the subject that he or she is free to leave:
In those situations where the police may be uncertain whether their
conduct is having a coercive effect on the individual, it is open to them
to inform the subject in unambiguous terms that he or she is under no
obligation to answer questions and is free to go.70

While it is hard to dispute the relevance of such a statement by the
police, it should not be seen as dispositive in every case. Even if the police tell a person that he or she does not have to answer any questions
and can leave, the subject may not understand this, or may not believe it.
In some cases, the assurance will be contradicted by subsequent police
actions. Trial courts will also have to grapple with the fact that the police
and the subject will often give very different accounts of the encounter
and of what was said. It is essential that trial judges not treat this kind of
police assurance as a prophylactic, but continue to examine all of the
circumstances when considering whether there has been a detention. This
is particularly important given the Grant majority’s repeated statement
that trial judges’ decisions on detention should be afforded “appropriate
deference”.71
Further, the Suberu majority’s conclusion that Mr. Suberu was not
detained is startling and troubling. If the police can sometimes prevent a
detention from crystallizing by “inform[ing] the subject in unambiguous
terms that he or she is under no obligation to answer questions and is free
to go”, as the Grant majority holds, the converse should also be true: unambiguously telling the subject that he or she is not free to go should
almost invariably trigger a detention. With respect, the Suberu majority’s
characterization of the exchange between the officer and Mr. Suberu as
ambiguous is unpersuasive. As Binnie J. points out in his dissent, in essence Mr. Suberu asked the officer if he was allowed to leave, and the
officer replied: “No.” Justice Binnie adds:
Generally speaking, the police mean what they say when they direct a
citizen to stay put. … No rational person in Mr. Suberu’s position
would have thought that he was free to walk away or that the police
would have let him go, had he tried.72

70
71
72

Grant, supra, note 1, at para. 32; see also para. 39.
Id., at para. 45; see also para. 43.
Suberu, supra, note 1, at paras. 50, 53.
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It is difficult not to see the Suberu majority as backpedalling to avoid
the practical implications of its expansive approach to section 10(b).
In the first three months following Grant and Suberu, a number of
lower courts have applied the Grant detention framework. In several of
these cases the Crown conceded that there had been a detention.73 However, in R. v. Peacock,74 where the existence of a detention was contested,
Greene J. of the Ontario Court of Justice applied the Grant framework to
find a detention. The police had approached the defendant as he walked
down the street, ordered him to “stop”, and “launch[ed] into a pointed
inquiry … focused on their suspicions of criminal conduct … [which]
quickly escalated into questions about any contraband he may be carrying”.75 Justice Greene found that this amounted to an arbitrary detention,
and also found that the police failure to advise the defendant of his right
to counsel violated section 10(b).
On the other hand, in R. v. Connor76 Molloy J. of the Ontario Superior Court interpreted Grant and Suberu as narrowing the meaning of
detention, relying on the new decisions to reverse her own previous finding that the defendant had been detained. The police had executed a
search warrant on Mr. Connor’s home, looking for child pornography.
The lead investigating officer testified that although he did not initially
think he had sufficient grounds to arrest Mr. Connor, he “would not have
permitted Mr. Connor to leave, even if Mr. Connor had asked”.77 The
trial judge found:
… that Mr. Connor felt intimidated and believed he was not free to
leave. That was a reasonable conclusion on his part, and indeed correct;
the police had no intention of allowing him to leave at that stage of the
inquiry.78

The police did not advise Mr. Connor of his right to counsel, and he
made some inculpatory admissions. Shortly before Grant and Suberu
were released, the trial judge ruled orally, with written reasons to follow,
73
See, e.g., R. v. Crocker, [2009] B.C.J. No. 1816, 2009 BCCA 388 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Crocker”] (police officer approached parked car, displayed his badge and ordered the driver to roll
down his window); R. v. Lee, [2009] O.J. No. 3868, 2009 ONCJ 434 (Ont. C.J.) (police stop man in
underground parking garage and question him for between 45 and 60 minutes).
74
[2009] O.J. No. 4073, 2009 ONCJ 479, at paras. 21-35 (Ont. C.J.).
75
Id., at para. 31. Justice Greene also found as fact that the police had threatened to physically search the defendant if he did not admit he was carrying drugs, but noted that she would have
found a detention even in the absence of this threat (at para. 32).
76
[2009] O.J. No. 3827, 2009 CanLII 48830 (Ont. S.C.J.).
77
Id., at para. 56.
78
Id., at para. 60.
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that there had been a detention but no section 10(b) violation, based on
the Ontario Court of Appeal’s holding in Suberu that there could be a
“brief interlude” between the onset of a detention and the duty to give a
section 10(b) caution. In her subsequent written reasons, Molloy J. acknowledged that the Supreme Court of Canada had overturned the Court
of Appeal on this point. Nevertheless, she upheld her previous conclusion
that there was no section 10(b) Charter breach by reversing herself on the
detention issue. She explained:
Although the circumstances in the case before me do not fall easily
within the Grant test, it is nevertheless useful to consider the three
factors within the test. There was no physical restraint of Mr. Connor.
However, the police were executing a search warrant and would not
have permitted Mr. Connor to simply wander about or leave while that
was ongoing. In that sense, he was “detained” or “delayed,” but this is
not dissimilar from police restraining individuals who attempt to enter a
crime scene. Mr. Connor was not detained at that point because of who
he was, or because he had been singled out, but rather because he
happened to be on the scene when the search warrant was being
executed. Further, the police objective was merely to explain the
warrant to Mr. Connor and to keep him out of the way while the search
proceeded. No questions were asked. Accordingly, the analysis of the
circumstances under the first factor in Grant favours a conclusion that
there was no detention within the meaning of s. 10(b).
The second factor deals with the nature of the police conduct.
There was nothing about that conduct, in and of itself, that would
suggest Mr. Connor was detained. There was virtually no physical
contact, the police tone was polite, no orders were issued to Mr.
Connor, the tone of voice used was calm and professional, no weapons
were drawn and the duration of the encounter was very brief. Again,
this analysis supports a finding that Mr. Connor was not detained.
With respect to the third factor, Mr. Connor had been a firefighter
for 22 years, he was well acquainted with many police officers
professionally, his own brother was a police officer, he was in a
position of some authority as acting captain of his fire station and he
was proficient in martial arts as well as being an instructor of martial
arts. He was not unsophisticated. All of these facts point to a person
who would not be easily intimidated by the police and support a
determination that there was no detention in this case.79

79

Id., at paras. 77-79.
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Justice Molloy acknowledged that “it seems odd to say that there was
no detention of Mr. Connor in circumstances where he clearly perceived
he was not free to leave and the police clearly would not have permitted
him to leave if he had asked”.80 However, she read Suberu as justifying
this conclusion:
I recognize that in Suberu the police officer told Mr. Suberu not to
leave before he had spoken to him and then proceeded to ask a number
of questions, which Mr. Suberu answered. Also, as was noted by
Binnie J. in his dissenting opinion, the officer himself testified that if,
instead of answering questions, Mr. Suberu had attempted to drive
away in his van, he would have given chase and effected a vehicle stop.
I do not see that situation as being substantially different from the
situation with Mr. Connor. If anything, there was less of a detention in
Mr. Connor’s situation as the officers did not say anything to detain or
delay him and did not ask him any questions.
Accordingly, it seems to me that an application of the Grant test,
as further expanded on in Suberu, leads to the conclusion that there was
no detention of Mr. Connor in this case up to the point of his arrest.
Still, it seems strange to find no detention in circumstances where both
the police and Mr. Connor believed that his liberty was restricted.81

Justice Molloy’s interpretation of the Grant and Suberu detention
analysis can be criticized.82 As the Grant majority explained, the key
question is “whether the reasonable person in the individual’s circum80

Id., at para. 80.
Id., at paras. 80-81.
82
In the alternative, the trial judge suggested that “detentions” during the execution of a
search warrant should not be considered “detentions” for s. 9 or 10(b) purposes, having regard to the
purpose of s. 10(b) and the practical consideration that it would be “wholly unworkable to require
police executing a search warrant to provide every person on the premises with their right to counsel
immediately upon entering the premises”. She relied on Lamer J.’s comment in R. v. Debot, [1989]
S.C.J. No. 118, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1140, at 1146 (S.C.C.) that “as a general rule police proceeding to a
search are not obligated to suspend the search and give a person the opportunity to retain and instruct
counsel, as for example when the search is of a home pursuant to a search warrant”. It can be argued
that the trial judge misinterpreted Debot. Immediately after the passage cited by the trial judge,
Lamer J. stated that “the matter is entirely different” when the subject of the search is also detained.
In this case, “immediately upon detention, the detainee does have the right to be informed of the
right to retain and instruct counsel” (at 1146). Justice Lamer noted that although “the police are not
obligated to suspend the search … until the detainee has the opportunity to retain counsel”, the detainee “immediately upon detention … does have the right to be informed of the right to retain and
instruct counsel” (at 1146, emphasis added). While it may well sometimes be impracticable for the
police to give persons detained during a search warrant immediate access to counsel, it is not generally impracticable to advise them of their rights. On a purposive analysis, even if not everyone
detained during the execution of a search warrant is in need of counsel, some people — including
Mr. Connor — plainly are.
81
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stances would conclude that he or she had been deprived by the state of
the liberty of choice”.83 The enumerated “Grant factors” are not meant to
be an exhaustive test, but are simply considerations that may in some
cases help shed light on this issue. Justice Molloy found as fact that Mr.
Connor believed he was being detained and, further, that his belief was
not only objectively reasonable, but correct. Having already reached this
conclusion, her close examination of the Grant factors arguably caused
her to lose sight of the forest for the trees.84 Right or wrong, however, her
ruling illustrates both the malleability and imprecision of the Grant test,
and the possibility that Suberu may be understood by lower courts as
substantially raising the bar for a finding of a detention.

III. SECTION 24(2)
1. The Collins/Stillman Framework
The Supreme Court of Canada’s first major section 24(2) decision, R.
v. Collins,85 released in 1987, established the now-familiar three-part analytical framework for determining the admissibility of unconstitutionally
obtained evidence. The “Collins test” directed judges to consider:
(1)

the effect of admitting the evidence on the fairness of the trial;

(2)

the seriousness of the violation; and

(3)

the effect of exclusion on the repute of the administration of justice.

Although in his majority opinion Lamer J. (as he then was) characterized this grouping of factors as merely “a matter of personal
preference”,86 over time the Collins framework acquired a talismanic
quality. For the next 10 years, the Court engaged in a vigorous debate
over how the three sets of Collins factors should properly be applied,

83

Grant, supra, note 1, at para. 44.
For instance, the third set of Grant factors — the “particular characteristics or circumstances of the individual … including age; physical stature, minority status, level of sophistication”
— is meant to help identify situations where someone might reasonably submit to perceived police
authority in circumstances where a more assertive or legally sophisticated person might refuse. Since
the police acknowledged that they were in fact detaining Mr. Connor, it is not apparent why his
relative sophistication should weigh against him on the detention issue.
85
[1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Collins”].
86
Id., at 284.
84
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with judges on all sides seeking to characterize their preferred position as
the one truest to the spirit of Collins.87
This debate came to a head in 1997 in Stillman.88 A panel of seven
justices originally heard Stillman’s appeal, but a re-hearing by the full
Court was ordered:
… [i]n view of the importance of the issues raised on the facts of this
appeal which, in some aspects, invite a re-consideration of established
principles as regards the application of s. 24(2).89

The Court expressly invited interveners to participate in the rehearing. Some observers expected the Court to use Stillman as an opportunity
to substantially change the section 24(2) framework. However, by a 6-3
majority the Court instead reaffirmed the key principles that had emerged
in the decade since Collins.
A central issue in Stillman involved the proper relationship between
the “trial fairness” branch of the Collins test and the second and third sets
of Collins factors. The dispute between the Stillman majority and the
three dissenters turned on two key questions:
(1)

What does it mean for a trial to be “unfair” in the section 24(2)
context?

(2)

What consequences should flow from a finding that admitting evidence would cause an “unfair” trial?

These questions are closely intertwined, since the impact on the repute of the administration of justice of allowing an “unfair” trial to
proceed cannot be measured without understanding the nature of the “unfairness”.
Justice Lamer’s reasons in Collins expressly linked the concept of
trial fairness to the principle against self-incrimination. He stated that
when an accused is unconstitutionally “conscripted against himself
through a confession or other evidence emanating from him”, admitting
the evidence “would render the trial unfair, for it did not exist prior to the
violation and it strikes at one of the fundamental tenets of a fair trial, the
right against self-incrimination”.90 The Stillman majority reaffirmed this
strong linkage between “trial fairness” and the principle against selfincrimination, holding (per Cory J.):
87
88
89
90

See, e.g., R. v. Burlingham, [1995] S.C.J. No. 39, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 206 (S.C.C.).
Supra, note 3.
Supreme Court of Canada Bulletin, May 23, 1996.
Collins, supra, note 85, at 284.
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It has, for a great many years, been considered unfair and indeed unjust
to seek to convict on the basis of a compelled statement or confession.
If it was obtained as a result of a breach of the Charter its admission
would generally tend to render the trial unfair.91

Although McLachlin J. dissented in Stillman, she agreed with the
majority on three points: (i) that the “trial fairness” branch of Collins was
principally concerned with protecting the principle against self-incrimination; (ii) that this principle is a component of “fundamental justice” in
section 7 of the Charter; and (iii) that the principle applies both to statements and to otherwise undiscoverable “derivative real evidence” —
evidence found as a result of a compelled statement.92 However,
L’Heureux-Dubé J. wrote separate dissenting reasons advocating a narrower conception of “trial fairness”. She would have replaced the Collins
distinction between “conscriptive” and “non-conscriptive” evidence with
a distinction between “reliable” and “unreliable” evidence.93
The main dispute in Stillman was over the consequences that should
flow from a finding that admitting evidence would offend the principle
against self-incrimination. Several previous majority judgments had suggested that the “unfairness” caused by admitting compelled selfincriminatory evidence is so great that “there is no need to consider the
other factors referred to in Collins, supra”.94 The Stillman majority endorsed this approach, holding that:
A consideration of trial fairness is of fundamental importance. If after
careful consideration it is determined that the admission of evidence
obtained in violation of a Charter right would render a trial unfair then
the evidence must be excluded without consideration of the other
Collins factors. A fair trial for those accused of a criminal offence is a
cornerstone of our Canadian democratic society. A conviction resulting
from an unfair trial is contrary to our concept of justice. To uphold such
91

Stillman, supra, note 3, at para. 86.
Justice McLachlin’s position on these issues in Stillman accorded with the position she
had taken previously in R. v. Hebert, [1990] S.C.J. No. 64, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151 (S.C.C.) and R. v.
Evans, [1991] S.C.J. No. 31, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 869 (S.C.C.), where she had been writing for the majority.
93
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé had proposed this analytic framework in her earlier dissents in
Burlingham, supra, note 87, and R. v. S. (R.J.), [1995] S.C.J. No. 10, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 451 (S.C.C.).
In Burlingham, Sopinka J. wrote a separate majority concurrence specifically rejecting L’HeureuxDubé J.’s emphasis on reliability, characterizing it as a “close relative of the rule in R. v. Wray” that
was inconsistent with Collins.
94
R. v. Mellenthin, [1992] S.C.J. No. 100, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 615, at 629 (S.C.C.); R. v. Elshaw, [1991] S.C.J. No. 68, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 24, at 45-46 (S.C.C.); R. v. Bartle, [1994] S.C.J. No. 74,
[1994] 3 S.C.R. 173, at 219 (S.C.C.).
92
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a conviction would be unthinkable. It would indeed be a travesty of
justice.
.....
[A] finding that the admission of the evidence would render the trial
unfair means that the administration of justice would necessarily be
brought into disrepute if the evidence were not excluded under s. 24(2).
… The Court, as a general rule, will exclude the evidence without
considering the seriousness of the breach or the effect of exclusion on
the repute of the administration of justice. This must be the result since
an unfair trial would necessarily bring the administration of justice into
disrepute.95

Justice Cory emphasized that this did not mean that “conscriptive”
evidence would automatically be excluded. Rather, he held that admitting
conscriptive evidence “will generally not render the trial unfair” if the
Crown can show “that it would have been discovered by alternative
non-conscriptive means”,96 and that when this burden is met the admissibility of the evidence will depend on the balancing of the second and
thirds sets of Collins factors. Although critics of the Stillman framework
sometimes described it as creating an “automatic exclusionary rule” for
conscriptive evidence, this is incorrect. What Stillman actually established was automatic exclusion of evidence that would render the trial
unfair, in the sense that its admission would violate the principle against
self-incrimination.
In her Stillman dissent, McLachlin J. disagreed with the majority on
this issue. She drew a distinction between trials that merely have “aspects
of unfairness” and trials that are “fundamentally unfair”, in the sense that
there is a real “danger that an innocent person may have been convicted”.97 In her view, a court that concluded that admitting evidence
would cause an unfair trial should then balance this unfairness against
the other Collins factors:
Depending on the degree of unfairness and countervailing
circumstances, the fairness of the manner in which the evidence was
obtained may or may not result in rejection of the evidence under s.
24(2). In an extreme case, where the unfairness casts doubt on the
safety of the verdict, it may, as a matter of application of the balancing

95
96
97

Stillman, supra, note 3, at paras. 72, 118-119
Id., at para. 119.
Id., at para. 257, per McLachlin J., dissenting.
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process, be predicted that the interest in admitting the evidence will
never outweigh the harm that would be done by its admission.98

As noted above, L’Heureux-Dubé J. would have narrowed the “trial
fairness” branch to focus exclusively on concerns about reliability, but
she indicated that she “[did] not disagree with McLachlin J. and her
analysis on this point”.99
A second important area of disagreement between the Stillman majority and the dissenters was over the scope of the principle against selfincrimination. Justice Cory, for the majority, extended the definition of
“conscriptive evidence” to include not only compelled statements and
derivative evidence, but also evidence obtained through the use of a suspect’s body. Justice McLachlin agreed that statements and derivative
evidence both engaged the principle against self-incrimination, but disagreed with the majority’s extension of the principle to include bodily
substances and similar evidence.
In summary, the Stillman majority treated the principle against selfincrimination as so fundamentally important that it required evidence to
be excluded, regardless of other considerations such as the degree of police fault, the reliability of the evidence and the seriousness of the
offence. The dissenters, in contrast, contemplated that evidence should
sometimes be admitted on the strength of these factors even though this
would render the trial “unfair”, as long as the reliability of the verdict
was not compromised. The dissenters also disagreed that the principle
against self-incrimination was engaged by evidence arising from “the
compelled use of the body”.
2. The Section 7 Self-Incrimination Jurisprudence
The evolution of the section 24(2) Collins test leading up to Stillman
occurred in parallel with another important development in the Charter —
the recognition of the principle against self-incrimination as a section 7
principle of fundamental justice. Section 7 comes into play when people
are lawfully compelled to speak. Section 13 of the Charter protects compellable witnesses100 in “proceedings” from having their testimony used
98

Id., at para. 259, per McLachlin J., dissenting.
Id., at para. 189, per L’Heureux-Dubé J., dissenting.
100
In R. v. Henry, [2005] S.C.J. No. 76, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 609 (S.C.C.), the Court held (at
para. 34) that for the purposes of s. 13, “evidence of compellable witnesses should be treated as
compelled even if their attendance was not enforced by a subpoena”.
99
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directly as evidence against them, but it does not prevent the prosecution
from using derivative evidence — that is, evidence found as a result of the
witnesses’ testimony. In a series of decisions in the 1990s, the Court held
that section 7 supplements section 13 by barring the self-incriminatory use
of such derivative evidence, if it was otherwise undiscoverable. Since lawful testimonial compulsion does not itself violate the Charter, a compelled
witness cannot seek to have derivative evidence excluded under section
24(2), which applies only to evidence that was “obtained in a manner that
infringed [the Charter]”. However, the Court held that the use of otherwise
undiscoverable evidence derived from compelled testimony would violate
the principle against self-incrimination, which the Court recognized to be
one of the section 7 “principles of fundamental justice”.
Under the section 7 self-incrimination jurisprudence, undiscoverable
derivative evidence is excluded to prevent the section 7 Charter breach
that would be caused by its admission. The section 7 self-incrimination
cases draw heavily on the Courts’ post-Collins section 24(2) decisions,
and establish rules under section 7 that deliberately mirror the Court’s
emerging approach to self-incriminatory evidence under section 24(2),
which was ultimately reaffirmed in Stillman. Both branches of Charter
jurisprudence are founded on the same key premise: that it is inherently
unfair to convict people by compelling them to become witnesses against
themselves. The section 7 cases take this premise a step further, holding
that it is not merely unfair but contrary to the principles of fundamental
justice enshrined in the Charter.
The Court consciously crafted section 7’s residual protection against
self-incrimination to dovetail with the Collins/Stillman section 24(2)
framework, in order to ensure that lawfully compelled speakers receive
the same protection under section 7 that section 24(2) gives to people
who are compelled to speak in breach of their Charter rights. In his majority reasons in R. v. S. (R.J.), Iacobucci J. referred to the section 24(2)
“trial fairness” cases and held:
Since it is the principle against self-incrimination which is at stake, and
since that principle finds recognition under s. 24(2) … we should avoid
the incongruity which would result if a different quality of protection
was offered to the witness who is compelled to answer questions. The
Charter should be construed as a coherent system. Accordingly, I think
that evidence which could not have been obtained, or the significance
of which could not have been appreciated, but for the testimony of a
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witness, ought generally to be excluded under s. 7 of the Charter in the
interests of trial fairness.101

Like the section 24(2) “trial fairness” cases, the leading section 7
self-incrimination decisions were not unanimous. However, the judges on
both sides of the debate agreed that consistency between sections 7 and
24(2) was essential. In particular, everyone agreed (i) that if admitting
certain lawfully obtained evidence would violate the principles of fundamental justice, the same evidence must necessarily be excluded under
section 24(2) when it is obtained unconstitutionally; and (ii) conversely,
if evidence is routinely admitted under section 24(2), its admission must
not offend the principles of fundamental justice. As Iacobucci J. explained in R. v. S. (R.J.):
If evidence derived from a Charter breach can be admitted on the
theory that its use will not bring the administration of justice into
disrepute, how then can it be said that to admit any evidence derived
from compelled testimony would be contrary to the principles of
fundamental justice? To make this argument is to suggest, inferentially,
that the admission of evidence which offends the principles of
fundamental justice does not bring the administration of justice into
disrepute. How can this be? As L’Heureux-Dubé J. observed in
Thomson Newspapers, supra, “[t]o state the question is to answer
it.”102

While everyone agreed with this general proposition, different members of the Court extracted different conclusions from this. The majority
decided that sections 7 and 24(2) should both be understood to prohibit
the admission of otherwise undiscoverable derivative evidence. In contrast, L’Heureux-Dubé J. thought that consistency should be achieved by
making derivative evidence admissible under both regimes. In her concurrence in R. v. S. (R.J.), she was sharply critical of the majority’s
decision to model the section 7 standard on the section 24(2) “trial fairness” jurisprudence, declaring that this would “raise serious problems if
this Court were to modify its approach to s. 24(2)”.103

101
102
103

Supra, note 93, at para. 191 (S.C.C.).
Id., at para. 177 (emphasis added).
Id., at para. 275, per L’Heureux-Dubé J.
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3. The Ontario Court of Appeal’s Decision in Grant
The Ontario Court of Appeal (per Laskin J.A.) concluded: (i) that
Mr. Grant had been arbitrarily detained, contrary to section 9 of the Charter; (ii) that his inculpatory admissions were “compelled”; (iii) that the
gun seized from his person was derivative evidence that the police would
not have located but for these admissions; and (iv) that admitting the gun
into evidence would thus render the trial “unfair”.104 However, the Ontario Court declined to take the next step mandated by Stillman and
exclude the gun. Justice Laskin justified his refusal to follow Stillman on
the strength of LeBel J.’s concurring reasons in R. v. Orbanski, which he
interpreted as implying that evidence rendering a trial unfair “will not
always bring the administration of justice into disrepute”, and thus need
not always be excluded.105
Justice Laskin proposed a new section 24(2) test in which exclusion
would depend on “the resulting degree of trial unfairness and on the
strength of the other two Collins factors”.106 He suggested further that the
degree of trial unfairness should be measured by examining the evidence’s reliability and considering whether it had been obtained by
“flagrant … abuse”.107 The self-incriminatory character of the evidence
played little or no role in his proposed analysis. Justice Laskin’s suggestion that “trial unfairness” can be outweighed by other Collins factors if
it does not affect the reliability of the outcome is directly contrary to the
majority judgment in Stillman, and closely resembles the views of the
Stillman dissenters.
4. The Supreme Court of Canada’s New Section 24(2) Test in Grant
(a) The Grant Majority’s New Test
When Grant was heard in April 2008, 11 years after Stillman, none
of the judges who had constituted the Stillman majority remained on the
Court. The seven justices108 who heard Grant unanimously decided to
104

Grant (C.A.), supra, note 11, at paras. 29-30, 46-48.
R. v. Orbanski; R. v. Elias, supra, note 49. Justice LeBel’s concurrence was joined by
Fish J. The majority found no Charter breach and did not address s. 24(2).
106
Grant (C.A.), supra, note 11, at para. 52.
107
Id., at para. 58.
108
Shortly before the hearings in Suberu, Grant and Shepherd, Bastarache J. had announced
that he was retiring from the Court. Although his retirement did not formally take effect until the end
of the spring term, his health did not permit him to sit on the Grant and Shepherd appeals, which
105
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adopt a “revised approach” to section 24(2). Six justices agreed on a new
section 24(2) framework, as set out in the majority reasons written jointly
by McLachlin C.J.C. and Charron J.109 The Grant majority’s new test
eliminates the “trial fairness” branch of the Collins test and repackages
the remaining two sets of Collins factors into a new three-prong test.
Significantly, the majority characterizes the section 24(2) exclusionary remedy as solely directed at “societal” concerns, stating:
Section 24(2) is not aimed at punishing the police or providing
compensation to the accused, but rather at systemic concerns. The s.
24(2) focus is on the broad impact of admission of the evidence on the
long-term repute of the justice system.110

Consistent with this conception of section 24(2)’s purpose, the three
branches of the Grant majority’s new test emphasize the “message” that
would be sent by excluding or admitting evidence in a particular case.
Courts are directed to consider and balance the following three factors:
(1) the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct (admission
may send the message the justice system condones serious state
misconduct),
(2) the impact of the breach on the Charter-protected interests of the
accused (admission may send the message that individual rights
count for little), and
(3) society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits.111

According to the majority:
The court’s role on a s. 24(2) application is to balance the assessments
under each of these lines of inquiry to determine whether, considering
all the circumstances, admission of the evidence would bring the
administration of justice into disrepute. These concerns, while not
precisely tracking the categories of considerations set out in Collins,

were heard together, or on Suberu, which was heard the previous week. When Harrison was argued
in December 2008, Bastarache J. had left the Court, but his replacement (Cromwell J.) had not yet
been formally appointed. Accordingly, all four appeals were heard by the same seven-member panel
(McLachlin C.J.C., and Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella and Charron JJ.).
109
Justices LeBel, Fish and Abella concurred with the majority. Justice Binnie wrote separate reasons on s. 9 of the Charter but concurred with the majority on s. 24(2). Justice Deschamps,
writing only for herself, agreed with the majority’s decision to overturn Collins and Stillman but
disagreed with the majority’s new s. 24(2) analytic framework.
110
Grant, supra, note 1, at para. 70.
111
Id., at para. 71.
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capture the factors relevant to the s. 24(2) determination as enunciated
in Collins and subsequent jurisprudence.112

The Chief Justice and Charron J. rejected the Collins/Stillman framework’s emphasis on “trial fairness”, declaring that “‘trial fairness’ in the
Collins/Stillman sense is no longer a determinative criterion for the s.
24(2) inquiry”.113 They stated:
It is difficult to reconcile trial fairness as a multifaceted and contextual
concept with a near-automatic presumption that admission of a broad
class of evidence will render a trial unfair, regardless of the
circumstances in which it was obtained. In our view, trial fairness is
better conceived as an overarching systemic goal than as a distinct
stage of the s. 24(2) analysis.114

Under the new Grant framework, the self-incriminatory character of
unconstitutionally obtained evidence remains a relevant and weighty
consideration under the second branch, in which the impact of the breach
on the accused’s Charter-protected interests is considered. However, it is
no longer a decisive factor: evidence will sometimes be admissible even
if its admission offends the principle against self-incrimination.
The Grant majority goes on to discuss how the different categories
of evidence established by the Collins/Stillman framework115 should be
analyzed under its new test. A recurring theme in the majority’s judgment
is that appeal courts should defer to trial courts’ weighing of the relevant
factors:
In all cases, it is the task of the trial judge to weigh the various
indications. No overarching rule governs how the balance is to be
struck. Mathematical precision is obviously not possible. However, the
preceding analysis creates a decision tree, albeit more flexible than the
Stillman self-incrimination test. We believe this to be required by the
words of s. 24(2). We also take comfort in the fact that patterns emerge
with respect to particular types of evidence. These patterns serve as
guides to judges faced with s. 24(2) applications in future cases. In this
112

Id.
Id., at para. 121.
114
Id., at para. 65.
115
The Collins/Stillman framework divided unconstitutionally obtained evidence into two
broad categories — “conscriptive” and “non-conscriptive”. Conscriptive evidence was defined to
include statements, evidence derived from statements, and evidence obtained through the “use of the
body”. Conscriptive evidence that was undiscoverable by non-conscriptive means was generally
subject to exclusion under the trial fairness branch, without regard to the second and third sets of
Collins factors. These factors only came into play in the case of non-conscriptive evidence and discoverable conscriptive evidence, the admission of which would not render the trial unfair.
113
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way, a measure of certainty is achieved. Where the trial judge has
considered the proper factors, appellate courts should accord
considerable deference to his or her ultimate determination.116

(b) Application of the New Grant Test to Particular Types of Evidence
(i) Statements
The Grant majority suggests that under its new test, unconstitutionally obtained statements will be subject to a “presumptive general,
although not automatic”117 rule of exclusion. Chief Justice McLachlin
and Charron J. state:
[T]he heightened concern with proper police conduct in obtaining
statements from suspects and the centrality of the protected interests
affected will in most cases favour exclusion of statements taken in
breach of the Charter, while the third factor, obtaining a decision on
the merits, may be attenuated by lack of reliability. This, together with
the common law’s historic tendency to treat statements of the accused
differently from other evidence, explains why such statements tend to
be excluded under s. 24(2).118

However, the majority suggests that a statement may still be admissible under its new test in certain narrow circumstances, such as if it was
made following a “technically defective” section 10(b) caution that nevertheless “clearly informed [the suspect] of his or her choice to speak to
the police”.119
(ii) Derivative Evidence
The Collins/Stillman framework and the section 7 self-incrimination
jurisprudence both treat otherwise undiscoverable evidence derived from
statements as essentially indistinguishable from the statements themselves. The Grant majority, however, holds that otherwise undiscoverable
derivative evidence can now be admitted even in circumstances where
the statement itself should be excluded. Under the majority’s new
approach, the undiscoverability of derivative evidence is no longer
116
117
118
119

Grant, supra, note 1, at para. 86.
Id., at para. 92.
Id., at para. 98.
Id., at para. 96.
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dispositive under section 24(2), although it remains a relevant factor
when assessing the impact of the Charter breach on the accused’s protected interests (the second branch of the new Grant test). Further, since
under the Stillman framework the Crown bore the burden of establishing
on a balance of probabilities that the police would have found the evidence by other, non-conscriptive means,120 any uncertainty on this
question was resolved in favour of the accused. In contrast, the Grant
majority states that “in cases where it cannot be determined with any
confidence whether evidence would have been discovered in absence of
the statement, discoverability will have no impact on the section 24(2)
inquiry”.121
The Grant majority notes that when the accused’s interest in making
a free and informed decision about whether or not to speak is “significantly compromised” by the Charter breach, this will be a factor
“strongly favour[ing] exclusion”.122 On the other hand, since physical
derivative evidence will generally not raise reliability concerns, “the public interest in having a trial adjudicated on the merits will usually favour
admission of the derivative evidence”.123 The majority concludes:
The weighing process and balancing of these concerns is one for
the trial judge in each case. Provided the judge has considered the
correct factors, considerable deference should be accorded to his or her
decision. As a general rule, however, it can be ventured that where
reliable evidence is discovered as a result of a good faith infringement
that did not greatly undermine the accused’s protected interests, the
trial judge may conclude that it should be admitted under s. 24(2). On
the other hand, deliberate and egregious police conduct that severely
impacted the accused’s protected interests may result in exclusion,
notwithstanding that the evidence may be reliable.
The s. 24(2) judge must remain sensitive to the concern that a more
flexible rule may encourage police to improperly obtain statements that
they know will be inadmissible, in order to find derivative evidence
which they believe may be admissible. The judge should refuse to
admit evidence where there is reason to believe the police deliberately
abused their power to obtain a statement which might lead them to such
evidence. Where derivative evidence is obtained by way of a deliberate

120
121
122
123

Stillman, supra, note 3, at paras. 103, 107, 116, 119.
Grant, supra, note 1, at para. 122.
Id., at para. 125.
Id., at para. 126.
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or flagrant Charter breach, its admission would bring the administration
of justice into further disrepute and the evidence should be excluded.124

On the facts of Grant itself, the majority found that the impact of the
breach on Mr. Grant’s Charter interests “was significant”. On the other
hand, the reliability of the gun as evidence favoured its admission. The
seriousness of the offence cut both ways — while it increased the societal importance of the prosecution, it also made it “all the more important
that [Mr. Grant’s] rights be respected”. Accordingly, the majority found
this factor to “not … be of much assistance”.125 Ultimately, the majority
concluded that while this was a “close case”, the fact that the police had
been “operating in circumstances of considerable legal uncertainty …
tips the balance in favour of admission”. The majority noted:
We add that the Court’s decision in this case will be to [sic] render
similar conduct less justifiable going forward. While police are not
expected to engage in judicial reflection on conflicting precedents, they
are rightly expected to know what the law is.126

(iii) Bodily Substances, etc.
The Stillman majority had held that evidence obtained unlawfully
through the use of a suspect’s body, including seized bodily substances,
engaged the principle against self-incrimination as much as statements
and derivative evidence. Justice Cory stated:
It is repugnant to fair-minded men and women to think that police can
without consent or statutory authority take or require an accused to
provide parts of their body or bodily substances in order to incriminate
themselves. The recognition of the right to bodily integrity and sanctity
is embodied in s. 7 of the Charter which confirms the right to life,
liberty and the security of the person and guarantees the equally
important reciprocal right not to be deprived of security of the person
except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. This
right requires that any interference with or intrusion upon the human
body can only be undertaken in accordance with principles of
fundamental justice. Generally that will require valid statutory authority
or the consent of the individual to the particular bodily intrusion or
interference required for the purpose of the particular procedure the
124
125
126

Id., at paras. 127-128.
Id., at para. 139.
Id., at para. 133.
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police wish to undertake. It follows that the compelled use of the body
or the compelled provision of bodily substances in breach of a Charter
right for purposes of self-incrimination will generally result in an unfair
trial just as surely as the compelled or conscripted self-incriminating
statement.127

Chief Justice McLachlin had disagreed with this analysis in her
Stillman dissent. Likewise, in Grant she and Charron J. reject it as unsound:
[A] simple conscription test for the admissibility of bodily evidence
under s. 24(2) … wrongly equates bodily evidence with statements
taken from the accused. In most situations, statements and bodily
samples raise very different considerations from the point of view of
the administration of justice. Equating them under the umbrella of
conscription risks erasing relevant distinctions and compromising the
ultimate analysis of systemic disrepute. As Professor Paciocco has
observed, “in equating intimate bodily substances with testimony we
are not so much reacting to the compelled participation of the accused
as we are to the violation of the privacy and dignity of the person that
obtaining such evidence involves”.128 … Nor does the taking of a
bodily sample trench on the accused’s autonomy in the same way as
may the unlawful taking of a statement. The pre-trial right to silence
under s. 7, the right against testimonial self-incrimination in s. 11(c),
and the right against subsequent use of self-incriminating evidence in s.
13 have informed the treatment of statements under s. 24(2). These
concepts do not apply coherently to bodily samples, which are not
communicative in nature, weakening self-incrimination as the sole
criterion for determining their admissibility.129

Accordingly, the Grant majority directs courts to determine the admissibility of seized bodily substances under its new analytical
framework by examining, under the second branch, “the degree to which
the search and seizure intruded upon the privacy, bodily integrity and
human dignity of the accused”. The majority concludes:
While each case must be considered on its own facts, it may be
ventured in general that where an intrusion on bodily integrity is
deliberately inflicted and the impact on the accused’s privacy, bodily
integrity and dignity is high, bodily evidence will be excluded,
127

Stillman, supra, note 3, at para. 89.
D. Paciocco, “Stillman, Disproportion and the Fair Trial Dichotomy” (1997) 2 Can. Crim.
L.R. 163, at 170.
129
Grant, supra, note 1, at para. 105
128
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notwithstanding its relevance and reliability. On the other hand, where
the violation is less egregious and the intrusion is less severe in terms
of privacy, bodily integrity and dignity, reliable evidence obtained from
the accused’s body may be admitted. For example, this will often be the
case with breath sample evidence, whose method of collection is
relatively non-intrusive.130

5. Analysis
(a) Grant’s Impact on the Principle against Self-incrimination and Stare
Decisis
The Grant majority’s repudiation of the Collins/Stillman section
24(2) framework has profound practical and theoretical implications. On
the level of constitutional theory, Grant raises serious questions about the
continued validity of the Court’s section 7 self-incrimination jurisprudence, which was deliberately crafted to be consistent with the nowabandoned Collins/Stillman section 24(2) framework. The underlying
premise of the section 7 self-incrimination cases is that it is fundamentally unjust to admit otherwise undiscoverable evidence derived from the
accused’s compelled statements, and that this evidence must therefore be
excluded to avoid the section 7 Charter breach its admission would
cause. Although some of the early section 7 cases suggested that the
power to exclude derivative evidence was “discretionary”, the section 7
jurisprudence as a whole, particularly the more recent cases, makes clear
that this “discretion” is limited to the factual issue whether a particular
piece of derivative evidence was otherwise discoverable.131 There is no
130

Id., at para. 111.
For example, in his judgment in Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Director of Investigation and Research), [1990] S.C.J. No. 23, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425 (S.C.C.), La Forest J. described
the power to exclude derivative evidence as “discretionary”, but later stated that exclusion was the
“price [that] must be paid where the use of evidence derived from compelled testimony would undermine the fairness of the trial”, adding: “The one thing the power to compel testimony will never
allow anti-combines investigators to use as evidence, however, is information they could not otherwise have uncovered” (at 555, 558, 561-62, per La Forest J.; at 484, per Wilson J.) (emphasis
added). Similarly, in R. v. S. (R.J.), supra, note 93, Iacobucci J. stated that the “derivative-use immunity will generally lead to exclusion” under s. 7 (at para. 200), adding that he would “not try to
imagine today the factual circumstances in which derivative-use immunity might not be protected.
When, if ever, that might occur, is an issue I leave for another day.” The more recent s. 7 selfincrimination cases abandon any suggestion that undiscoverable derivative evidence might sometimes be admissible. For instance, in Re Application under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code, [2004]
S.C.J. No. 40, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 248 (S.C.C.), the Court stated that “testimonial compulsion has been
invariably linked with evidentiary immunity”, and described the exclusion of derivative evidence as
131
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suggestion in the section 7 cases that otherwise undiscoverable derivative
evidence can be admitted because of the public importance in securing a
conviction in a particular prosecution.132 Rather, the key principle animating the section 7 cases is that a conviction so obtained would be
contrary to the principles of fundamental justice. The “principles of fundamental justice” are, by definition, “fundamental”: they cannot
routinely be overridden by other considerations, including society’s interest in punishing wrongdoers.133 Under the existing section 7
jurisprudence, if Mr. Grant had been lawfully compelled to testify and
had revealed that there was an illegal gun in his apartment, the gun
plainly could not have been admitted as evidence against him in any subsequent prosecution if it was not independently discoverable. Under the
Collins/Stillman approach, the gun would also have been excluded when,
as here, he revealed its existence and location as a consequence of
unlawful and unconstitutional coercion.134 The majority decision in
Grant destroys this symmetry, and leads to the perverse result that derivative evidence that is inadmissible when it is obtained lawfully now

a “necessary safeguard” that “provide[s] the parameters within which self-incriminating testimony
can be obtained” and that “must necessarily” be granted to a compelled witness (at paras. 70, 71,
79).
132
The s. 7 self-incrimination cases involve a “balancing” of state and individual interests at
the point where the Court considers whether a particular form of lawful testimonial compulsion
engages the principle against self-incrimination. In contexts where compulsion is found not to engage the principle against self-incrimination (e.g., as was found to be the case with the fishing
reports in R. v. Fitzpatrick, [1995] S.C.J. No. 94, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 154 (S.C.C.)), the state is free to
use both the statement and any derivative evidence to incriminate the speaker. However, in contexts
where the principle against self-incrimination is engaged, the accused’s s. 7 interests cannot be outweighed by the state’s interest in obtaining a conviction in a particular case. For instance, in R. v.
White, [1999] S.C.J. No. 28, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 417 (S.C.C.) the Court conducted an initial “balancing”
analysis to determine whether compelled motor vehicle accident reports generally attract s. 7 Charter
protection. Once it was decided that they do, Ms White’s claim to evidentiary immunity essentially
became absolute. There is no suggestion in the majority’s judgment that a violation of her individual
s. 7 rights could be justified based on the state’s interest in obtaining a conviction in her particular
case.
133
The Court has held that violations of s. 7 will only be justifiable under s. 1 in “exceptional circumstances” involving “extraordinary conditions”: see, e.g., Reference re Motor Vehicle
Act (British Columbia) S 94(2), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, at 518 (S.C.C.); R. v.
Heywood, [1994] S.C.J. No. 101, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761, at 802 (S.C.C.); New Brunswick (Minister of
Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.), [1999] S.C.J. No. 47, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46, at para. 99
(S.C.C.); R. v. Ruzic, [2001] S.C.J. No. 25, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687, at para. 92 (S.C.C.).
134
In R. v. Jones, [1994] S.C.J. No. 42, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 229, at 248-49 (S.C.C.), Lamer
C.J.C. (dissenting in the result) held that: “[a]ny state action that coerces an individual to furnish
evidence against him- or herself in a proceeding in which the individual and the state are adversaries
violates the principle against self-incrimination. Coercion, it should be noted, means the denial of
free and informed consent.” This statement was later adopted by a majority of the Supreme Court in
R. v. Fitzpatrick, supra, note 132, and R. v. White, supra, note 132.
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becomes potentially admissible when it is obtained in violation of the
Charter. This is an incoherent and fundamentally untenable position.
The Grant majority does not grapple with the implications its decision has for the Court’s existing section 7 self-incrimination
jurisprudence. Rather, it avoids addressing the issue squarely by asserting
that the impact of admission on “trial fairness” simply need no longer be
considered under section 24(2). However, this simply sweeps the issue
under the carpet. To adopt the words of Iacobucci J. in R. v. S. (R.J.),
quoted previously, the Grant majority judgment:
… suggest[s], inferentially, that the admission of evidence which
offends the principles of fundamental justice does not bring the
administration of justice into disrepute. How can this be? As
L’Heureux-Dubé J. observed in Thomson Newspapers, supra, “[t]o
state the question is to answer it.”135

If evidence that offends the principle against self-incrimination is
now routinely admissible under section 24(2), this principle cannot really
be as fundamental as the section 7 self-incrimination cases suppose. Despite the Grant majority’s assertion that it did not wish to “undermin[e]
the principles that animate the jurisprudence to date”,136 its repudiation of
the Collins/Stillman framework inevitably has this effect. In the coming
years, prosecutors, may begin training their sights on the parallel section
7 exclusionary rule established in R. v. S. (R.J.), British Columbia (Securities Commission) v. Branch,137 R. v. White138 and R. v. Jarvis139 and
arguing that this Charter doctrine should also now be reconsidered in
light of Grant.
Even leaving aside Grant’s impact on section 7 of the Charter, the
Court’s decision to sweep away 20 years of settled section 24(2) jurisprudence is virtually unprecedented. The Court has previously stated that
“[t]here must be compelling circumstances to justify departure from a
prior decision”140 and declared that it “should be particularly careful before reversing a precedent where the effect is to diminish Charter
protection”.141 It is therefore surprising for the Court to overturn Collins
and Stillman — both watershed judgments in the history of the Charter
135
136
137
138
139
140
141

R. v. S. (R.J.), supra, note 93, at 533.
Grant, supra, note 1, at para. 3.
[1995] S.C.J. No. 32, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.).
[1999] S.C.J. No. 28, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 417 (S.C.C.).
[2002] S.C.J. No. 76, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 757 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Robinson, [1996] S.C.J. No. 32, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 683, at para. 16 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Henry, supra, note 100, at para. 44.
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— without any mention of the principle of stare decisis. The Grant majority gives only a perfunctory explanation of what it sees as wrong with
the Stillman majority’s approach, and does not address the broader implications of a majority of the current Court simply substituting their views
for those of the Stillman majority. Whatever else might be said about
Stillman, it was an extremely carefully considered decision. When it was
decided in 1997, the debate over section 24(2) had been going on for 10
years, and the main criticisms and arguments against the Collins/Stillman
approach were well known and fully canvassed. All that has changed in
the past 10 years is the composition of the Court.
Although the Grant majority relies to some degree on pragmatic arguments — such as its contention that the Collins/Stillman “discoverability” test has “proved difficult to apply” in practice “because of its
hypothetical nature” and “fine-grained distinctions” — its disagreement
with the Stillman majority is ultimately a dispute over fundamental constitutional principles. The Stillman majority’s approach to section 24(2)
flows directly from its conception of the principle against selfincrimination, and its belief that a conviction obtained by violating this
principle would be “unthinkable” and “a travesty of justice”.142 The
Grant majority evidently sees nothing wrong with allowing at least some
convictions to be based on compelled and otherwise undiscoverable selfincriminatory evidence. What is missing from its analysis is a cogent articulation of why something previously declared to be “unthinkable”
should now be seen as acceptable. Likewise, the Grant majority does not
explain why it is appropriate for the Court to suddenly change the foundational principles on which much of its Charter jurisprudence over the
past 20 years is based.
(b) Practical Implications of Grant and Harrison in Future Section 24(2)
Cases
(i) Conscriptive Evidence
The most significant and immediate practical implication of Grant
is that much “conscriptive” evidence that would have been excluded
under the Collins/Stillman “trial fairness” branch will now be admitted
under the Court’s new discretionary balancing test. While trial courts
142

R. v. Stillman, supra, note 3, at para. 72.
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will likely continue to exclude most unconstitutionally obtained statements, it will now be much easier for prosecutors to obtain admission
of derivative evidence. In terms of the sheer number of cases affected,
the most significant impact will be on cases involving seized bodily
substances, including breath samples.143 Admission of this type of evidence is likely to become the norm, with exclusion being reserved for
cases involving exceptionally invasive searches or especially egregious
police misconduct.
The early returns support these predictions. Lower courts have regularly followed Grant’s suggestion that breath samples should generally
be excluded only when the police misconduct is egregious.144 On the
other hand, unconstitutionally obtained self-incriminatory statements
have continued to be excluded under the Grant framework.145 Derivative
evidence found as a result of inculpatory statements made by detainees to
the police has also been excluded in several post-Grant cases, but in cir-

143
In the case of breath samples, Grant renders moot the post-Stillman debate over the
meaning of Cory J.’s cryptic obiter comments at para. 90 of his majority reasons, which could be
read in several different ways: (i) as creating an exception to the general rule in Stillman that admitting unconstitutionally obtained bodily substances would render the trial unfair (see, e.g., R. v. Scott,
[2001] O.J. No. 853, 10 M.V.R. (4th) 302, at para. 28 (Ont. S.C.J.); R. v. Skuse, [2004] O.J. No.
2726, 2004 ONCJ 91 (Ont. C.J.)); (ii) as creating an exception to the general rule in Stillman that
evidence that would render a trial unfair must be excluded (see, e.g., R. v. Mastromartino, [2004]
O.J. No. 1435, 70 O.R. (3d) 540, at paras. 36-38, 67 (Ont. S.C.J.); R. v. Soal, [2005] O.J. No. 319,
2005 CanLII 2323, at paras. 35-36 (Ont. S.C.J.)); or (iii) as an attempt to explain why statutes authorizing the warrantless seizure of breath samples and fingerprints are constitutional (see, e.g., R. v.
Shepherd, [2007] S.J. No. 119, 2007 SKCA 29, at paras. 68-118 (Sask. C.A.), per Smith J.A., dissenting; R. v. McKenzie, 1999 CanLII 14904, at paras. 15-17 (Ont. S.C.J.); R. v. Carroll, [2002] O.J.
No. 1215, 24 M.V.R. (4th) 248, at paras. 16-19 (Ont. C.J.); R. v. Schaeffer, [2005] S.J. No. 144, 194
C.C.C. (3d) 517, at paras. 50-58 (Sask. C.A.)).
144
See, e.g., R. v. Fildan, [2009] O.J. No. 3604, 201 C.R.R. (2d) 12 (Ont S.C.J.); R. v. Bryce,
[2009] O.J. No. 3640, 2009 CanLII 45842 (Ont. S.C.J.); R. v. Du, [2009] O.J. No. 3194, 2009
CanLII 39783 (Ont. S.C.J.); R. v. Neff, [2009] O.J. No. 3873, 2009 ONCJ 436 (Ont. C.J.); R. v. Vinoharan, [2009] O.J. No. 4037 (Ont. S.C.J.); R. v. White, [2009] B.C.J. No. 2050, 2009 BCPC 312
(B.C. Prov. Ct.); R. v. Howell, [2009] A.J. No. 1042, 2009 ABPC 276 (Alta. Prov. Ct.); R. v. Rusnak,
[2009] A.J. No. 970, 2009 ABPC 258 (Alta. Prov. Ct.); R. v. Kimmel, [2009] A.J. No. 1080, 2009
ABPC 289 (Alta. Prov. Ct.); R. v. Tooke, [2009] A.J. No. 1081, 2009 ABPC 292 (Alta. Prov. Ct.); R.
v. Hennigar, [2009] N.S.J. No. 417, 2009 NSPC 42 (N.S. Prov. Ct.). In some of these cases the court
found no Charter breach but indicated that it would have admitted the breath samples under s. 24(2)
in any event. However, breath samples were excluded in R. v. Beattie, [2009] O.J. No. 4121, 2009
ONCJ 456 (Ont. C.J.), based on the court’s concern about the long-term impact of condoning police
disregard for the statutory time requirements for conducting roadside screening tests, and in R. v.
Sergalis, [2009] O.J. No. 4823, 90 M.V.R. (5th) 116 (Ont. S.C.J), based on a finding that the officer
knew or should have known that he had no legal basis to initially detain the defendant.
145
See, e.g., R. v. Whyte, [2009] O.J. No. 3557, 2009 ONCJ 389 (Ont. C.J.); R. v. Comber,
[2009] O.J. No. 3854, 2009 ONCJ 418 (Ont. C.J.).
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cumstances where the court characterized the police misconduct as serious.146
(ii) Non-Conscriptive Evidence
The impact of Grant and Harrison on the admissibility of evidence
that would previously have been classified as “non-conscriptive” or as
“conscriptive but discoverable” is likely to be more subtle. Under the
Collins/Stillman approach, the admissibility of this type of evidence was
determined by balancing the second and third sets of Collins factors. The
second set of Collins factors, relating to the “seriousness of the violation”, actually involved two analytically distinct considerations. Some
breaches are “serious” because of the gravity of their impact on the suspect’s protected Charter interests, while others are “serious” because they
demonstrate a blatant police disregard for, or ignorance of, the Charter and
the limits on their powers. Breaches are often “serious” in one sense but
not the other. The new Grant test directs judges to address these two different considerations separately, which should promote analytic clarity.
The Grant majority emphasizes that applying its new test to individual
cases will be a highly fact-specific exercise. However, the conclusions
reached by the Court on the facts of Grant and Harrison and in a subsequent decision, R. v. Morelli,147 are instructive. As discussed above, in
Grant the Court ultimately admitted the evidence, but described it as a
“close case”, in which the uncertainty surrounding the law of detention
tipped the balance in favour of admission. Significantly, the Court treats
the public safety concerns associated with gun crimes as important, but not
necessarily dispositive. Grant thus may be helpful in rebutting the suggestion that has sometimes been made in the past that there should be nearautomatic inclusion of guns under section 24(2). Further, the Court’s shift
in focus away from self-incrimination as the predominant section 24(2)
146
See, e.g., R. v. J. (J.A.), [2009] O.J. No. 4081 (Ont. C.J.) (excluding knife and t-shirt
found following an accused youth’s inculpatory statements made in the wake of a “serious” s. 10(b)
breach); R. v. Peacock, supra, note 74 (excluding small quantity of cocaine found as a result of defendant’s inculpatory statements following ss. 9 and 10(b) violations which “evinced a pattern of
constitutionally bad behaviour” by the police); R. v. Lee, supra, note 73 (excluding cocaine found
after police, with insufficient grounds, detained the defendant in an underground garage, handcuffed
him and questioned him about whether he was in possession of drugs, threatening, “Be honest, because if we find it on you you’re in bigger trouble,” after which the defendant made an inculpatory
admission); R. v. Nguyen, [2009] O.J. No. 4564 (Ont S.C.J.) (gun and drugs found as a result of
defendant’s inculpatory utterances following a “deliberate and flagrant” s. 10(b) violation excluded).
147
[2010] S.C.J. No. 8, 2010 SCC 8 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Morelli”].
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factor, and the renewed emphasis placed on police misconduct, may make
it easier to have guns excluded in cases where the police deliberately or
negligently disregard the Charter, even when the principle against selfincrimination is not engaged (for instance, when the police unlawfully detain and search a suspect with insufficient grounds, but do not elicit a selfincriminatory statement).
The Court’s application of its new test to the facts of Harrison is particularly important. The officer in Harrison pulled over the accused’s
rented vehicle for specious reasons,148 and proceeded to search some
sealed boxes in the cargo area, ostensibly in order to look for the accused’s driver’s licence. The boxes turned out to contain 35 kilograms of
cocaine. The trial judge found that the officer had committed “brazen and
flagrant” Charter violations, and that his evidence was “contrived and
def[ied] credibility”. Nevertheless, he admitted the evidence, essentially
on the grounds that the Charter breaches “pale in comparison to the
criminality involved” in transporting large quantities of cocaine. A 2-1
majority149 of the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld this decision, emphasizing that the officer’s misconduct “was not shown to be systemic in
nature”150 and that the accused’s “privacy interest in the car was low”.151
By a 6-1 majority,152 the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the evidence should have been excluded. On the first prong of the new Grant test
— the “seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct” — the majority agreed with the trial judge that the breaches were serious, stating:
The officer’s determination to turn up incriminating evidence blinded
him to constitutional requirements of reasonable grounds. While the
violations may not have been “deliberate”, in the sense of setting out to
breach the Charter, they were reckless and showed an insufficient
regard for Charter rights. Exacerbating the situation, the departure from

148
The officer initially activated his lights because the vehicle had no front licence plate, but
very quickly realized that the vehicle was registered in Alberta, which requires only a rear plate. He
testified that he continued with the stop because he thought “abandoning the detention may have
affected the integrity of the police in the eyes of observers” (Harrison, supra, note 1, at para. 5).
149
R. v. Harrison, [2008] O.J. No. 427, 231 C.C.C. (3d) 118 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Harrison (C.A.)”]. The majority opinion was written jointly by O’Connor A.C.J.O. and McPherson J.A.,
while Cronk J.A. dissented.
150
Id., at para. 60.
151
Id., at para. 5.
152
The majority reasons were written by McLachlin C.J.C. and concurred in by Binnie, LeBel, Fish, Abella and Charron JJ., with Deschamps J. dissenting.
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Charter standards was major in degree, since reasonable grounds for
the initial stop were entirely non-existent.153

Chief Justice McLachlin noted that “while evidence of a systemic
problem can properly aggravate the seriousness of the breach and weigh
in favour of exclusion, the absence of such a problem is hardly a mitigating factor”.154 She also held that the officer’s misleading testimony (as
found by the trial judge):
While not part of the Charter breach itself … is properly a factor to
consider as part of the first inquiry under the s. 24(2) analysis given the
need for a court to dissociate itself from such behaviour. As Cronk J.A.
observed [in her dissent in the Ontario Court of Appeal] “the integrity
of the judicial system and the truth-seeking function of the courts lie at
the heart of the admissibility inquiry envisaged under s. 24(2) of the
Charter. Few actions more directly undermine both of these goals than
misleading testimony in court from persons in authority”.155

The Harrison majority’s confirmation that police misconduct on the
witness stand can strengthen the case for exclusion is an important development in the section 24(2) jurisprudence. The Chief Justice concluded:
In sum, the conduct of the police that led to the Charter breaches in this
case represented a blatant disregard for Charter rights. This disregard
for Charter rights was aggravated by the officer’s misleading testimony
at trial. The police conduct was serious, and not lightly to be
condoned.156

Turning to the second branch of the new Grant test — the impact of
the Charter breach on the accused’s Charter-protected interests — the
majority disagreed with the Court of Appeal majority’s holding “that the
effects of the breaches on [Harrison’s] rights … were relatively minor”.
Rather, McLachlin C.J.C. stated:
[B]eing stopped and subjected to a search by the police without
justification impacts on the motorist’s rightful expectation of liberty
and privacy in a way that is much more than trivial.157

153

Harrison, supra, note 1, at para. 24.
Id., at para. 25.
155
Id., at para. 26, quoting from the dissenting reasons of Cronk J.A. in Harrison (C.A.), supra, note 149, at para. 160.
156
Id., at para. 27.
157
Id., at paras. 31 and 63.
154
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She concluded that “the deprivation of liberty and privacy represented by the unconstitutional detention and search was therefore a
significant, although not egregious, intrusion on the appellant’s Charterprotected interests.” This holding may help to counter the troubling tendency in some lower courts to treat motorists’ privacy interest in their
vehicles as not merely “reduced” in comparison to the high privacy interest associated with a home or office, but as insignificant and unworthy
of much consideration.158
On the third branch of the Grant test — “society’s interest in an adjudication on the merits” — the Chief Justice noted that the charges were
serious, that the seized cocaine was reliable evidence that was essential
to the Crown’s case. However, she cautioned that the seriousness of the
offence “must not take on disproportionate significance” in the balancing
analysis.159
Chief Justice McLachlin concluded:
The police conduct in stopping and searching the appellant’s vehicle
without any semblance of reasonable grounds was reprehensible, and
was aggravated by the officer’s misleading testimony in court. The
Charter infringements had a significant, although not egregious, impact
on the Charter-protected interests of the appellant. These factors favour
exclusion, the former more strongly than the latter. On the other hand,
the drugs seized constitute highly reliable evidence tendered on a very
serious charge, albeit not one of the most serious known to our criminal
law. This factor weighs in favour of admission.
The balancing exercise mandated by s. 24(2) is a qualitative one,
not capable of mathematical precision. It is not simply a question of
whether the majority of the relevant factors favour exclusion in a
particular case. The evidence on each line of inquiry must be weighed
in the balance, to determine whether, having regard to all the
circumstances, admission of the evidence would bring the
administration of justice into disrepute. Dissociation of the justice
system from police misconduct does not always trump the truth-seeking
interests of the criminal justice system. Nor is the converse true. In all
cases, it is the long-term repute of the administration of justice that
must be assessed.160

In her opinion, the trial judge had erred by overemphasizing the third
set of Grant factors and underemphasizing the first set, thereby “trans158
159
160

See, e.g., R. v. Alkins, [2007] O.J. No. 1348, 218 C.C.C. (3d) 97, at para. 40 (Ont. C.A.).
Harrison, supra, note 1, at para. 34.
Id., at paras. 35-36.
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form[ing] the s. 24(2) analysis into a simple contest between the degree
of the police misconduct and the seriousness of the offence”. She concluded:
The police misconduct [in Harrison] was serious; indeed, the trial
judge found that it represented a “brazen and flagrant” disregard of the
Charter. To appear to condone wilful and flagrant Charter breaches that
constituted a significant incursion on the appellant’s rights does not
enhance the long-term repute of the administration of justice; on the
contrary, it undermines it. In this case, the seriousness of the offence
and the reliability of the evidence, while important, do not outweigh the
factors pointing to exclusion.
As Cronk J.A. put it [in her dissent in the Court of Appeal],
allowing the seriousness of the offence and the reliability of the
evidence to overwhelm the s. 24(2) analysis “would deprive those
charged with serious crimes of the protection of the individual
freedoms afforded to all Canadians under the Charter and, in effect,
declare that in the administration of the criminal law ‘the ends justify
the means’”(para. 150). Charter protections must be construed so as to
apply to everyone, even those alleged to have committed the most
serious criminal offences. … [T]he trial judge seemed to imply that
where the evidence is reliable and the charge is serious, admission will
always be the result. As Grant makes clear, this is not the law.
Additionally, the trial judge’s observation that the Charter breaches
“pale in comparison to the criminality involved” in drug trafficking
risked the appearance of turning the s. 24(2) inquiry into a contest
between the misdeeds of the police and those of the accused. The fact
that a Charter breach is less heinous than the offence charged does not
advance the inquiry mandated by s. 24(2). We expect police to adhere
to higher standards than alleged criminals.
In summary, the price paid by society for an acquittal in these
circumstances is outweighed by the importance of maintaining Charter
standards. That being the case, the admission of the cocaine into
evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. It
should have been excluded.161

The Court had a further occasion to apply its new section 24(2)
framework in R. v. Morelli, decided in March 2010, eight months after
the release of Grant and Harrison. The police in Morelli obtained a
search warrant to enter the defendant’s home and seize his computer in
161

Id., at paras. 39-42.
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order to search for child pornography images. Writing for the majority,162
Fish J. found that the information to obtain the search warrant contained
a number of false and misleading assertions and material omissions, and
that the “amplified” record did not provide sufficient grounds to support
the issuance of the warrant. Accordingly, the search executed pursuant to
the invalid warrant violated section 8 of the Charter. Turning to section
24(2), Fish J. accepted the trial judge’s finding that the drafting errors in
the search warrant information were unintentional. He noted further that
the executing officers believed they were acting pursuant to a valid warrant and thus “did not wilfully or even negligently breach the Charter”,
which “favour[ed] admission of the evidence”.163 On the other hand, he
found that “the officer who prepared the ITO was neither reasonably
diligent nor mindful of his duty to make full and frank disclosure. At
best, the ITO was improvidently and carelessly drafted”.164 On balance,
Fish J. concluded that the first set of Grant factors favoured exclusion:
The repute of the administration of justice is jeopardized by
judicial indifference to unacceptable police conduct. Police officers
seeking search warrants are bound to act with diligence and integrity,
taking care to discharge the special duties of candour and full
disclosure that attach in ex parte proceedings. In discharging those
duties responsibly, they must guard against making statements that are
likely to mislead the justice of the peace. They must refrain from
concealing or omitting relevant facts. And they must take care not to
otherwise exaggerate the information upon which they rely to establish
reasonable and probable grounds for issuance of a search warrant.
We are bound to accept the trial judge’s finding that there was no
deliberate misconduct on the part of the officer who swore the
Information. The repute of the administration of justice would
nonetheless be significantly eroded, particularly in the long term, if
such unacceptable police conduct were permitted to form the basis for
so intrusive an invasion of privacy as the search of our homes and the
seizure and scrutiny of our personal computers.165

Turning to the second set of Grant factors, Fish J. emphasized the
extremely high privacy interest attaching to the contents of one’s personal computer, stating:
162
Chief Justice McLachlin and Binnie and Abella JJ. concurred in Fish J.’s majority reasons. The dissenters (Deschamps J., joined by Charron and Rothstein JJ.) would have found no
Charter breach and thus did not address s. 24(2).
163
Morelli, supra, note 147, at para. 99.
164
Id.
165
Id., at paras. 102-103.
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[I]t is difficult to imagine a more intrusive invasion of privacy than the
search of one’s home and personal computer. Computers often contain
our most intimate correspondence. They contain the details of our
financial, medical, and personal situations. They even reveal our
specific interests, likes, and propensities, recording in the browsing
history and cache files the information we seek out and read, watch, or
listen to on the Internet.
It is therefore difficult to conceive a s. 8 breach with a greater impact
on the Charter-protected privacy interests of the accused than occurred
in this case.166

With respect to the third set of Grant factors, Fish J. noted that excluding the seized evidence would leave the Crown with no case and
would “seriously undermine the truth-seeking function of the trial” — a
factor favouring admission.167 Nevertheless, he concluded:
[W]e are required by Grant to bear in mind the long-term and
prospective repute of the administration of justice, focussing less on the
particular case than on the impact over time of admitting the evidence
obtained by infringement of the constitutionally protected rights of the
accused.
In my view, the repute of the administration of justice will be
significantly undermined if criminal trials are permitted to proceed on
the strength of evidence obtained from the most private “place” in the
home on the basis of misleading, inaccurate, and incomplete
Informations upon which a search warrant was issued.
Justice is blind in the sense that it pays no heed to the social status
or personal characteristics of the litigants. But justice receives a black
eye when it turns a blind eye to unconstitutional searches and seizures
as a result of unacceptable police conduct or practices.
The public must have confidence that invasions of privacy are
justified, in advance, by a genuine showing of probable cause. To admit
the evidence in this case and similar cases in the future would
undermine that confidence in the long term.168

Accordingly, the evidence was excluded and Morelli was acquitted.
A review of post-Grant lower court section 24(2) decisions suggests
that although the new Grant test does not radically change the substance
of the second and third branches of the Collins/Stillman framework, the
166
167
168
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reorganization of the relevant factors is encouraging courts to place renewed emphasis on the egregiousness of the police misconduct when
deciding whether or not to exclude evidence. In a significant Ontario
post-Grant decision, R. v. Blake, the Ontario Court of Appeal described
Grant as having “[taken] a judicial wire brush to the 20 years of jurisprudential gloss that had built up around s. 24(2) and scrubbed down to
the bare words of the section”.169 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that
“in the circumstances of this case the application of Grant yields the
same result as did the application of Collins”170 (namely, admission of
the evidence). The police in Blake obtained a warrant to search a dwelling house, primarily on the strength of a tip from a confidential
informant. Drugs were seized during the search. At trial (conducted prior
to the release of Grant) the Crown invoked confidential informant privilege and elected to defend the search on the basis of a heavily redacted
version of the search warrant information. The defence did not challenge
the Crown’s assertion of privilege, but argued that the redacted information disclosed insufficient grounds to support the issuance of the warrant.
The trial judge agreed and found a section 8 Charter breach, but admitted
the seized evidence under section 24(2). The Ontario Court of Appeal
upheld this decision,171 emphasizing that the police had acted in good
faith throughout. Writing for the Court, Doherty J.A. stated:
Not only do I agree with the trial judge’s finding of good faith on the
part of the investigators, I can see no possible criticism of the police
conduct on this trial record. Throughout the process that culminated in
the seizure of the evidence, they acted exactly as they were obligated to
under the law. They were required to obtain a warrant before entering
the residence. They did so. They were required to make full disclosure
to the justice of the peace. There is no suggestion that they did not do
so. The police, and later the Crown, were legally obligated to protect
the identity of the confidential informants by removing all material
from the information that could identify the informants before making
that material available to the defence. They did that. Given the manner
in which the s. 8 claim was litigated, the police acted not only in good
faith, but as required by the law. The police conduct in this case does
169

R. v. Blake, [2010] O.J. No. 48, 2010 ONCA 1, at para. 21 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter

“Blake”].
170

Id., at para. 2. Similar conclusions have been reached in a number of other cases where
pre-Grant s. 24(2) decisions have been reviewed in light of Grant: see, e.g., R. v. Lucas, [2009] O.J.
No. 3514, 196 C.R.R. (2d) 1 (Ont. S.C.J.); R. v. Mahmood, [2009] O.J. No. 3192, 194 C.R.R. (2d)
180 (Ont. S.C.J.).
171
The Crown in Blake did not contest the trial judge’s finding of a s. 8 violation.

(2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d) CHARTER DETENTION AND THE EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE

433

not fit anywhere on the misconduct continuum described in Grant, at
para. 74.172

Although the interference with the defendant’s Charter rights occasioned by the search of his home was “very serious”,173 the seized
evidence “was entirely reliable and essential to the Crown’s case”.174 On
balance, Doherty J.A. concluded that the three Grant factors favoured
admitting the evidence:
Having conducted the inquiries mandated by Grant, examined the
application of those inquiries to non-bodily physical evidence in Grant
(paras. 112-115) and its companion case, R. v. Harrison … I would
hold that the nature of the state conduct and society’s interest in an
adjudication on the merits militate strongly in favour of admitting the
evidence. The impact on the appellant’s s. 8 rights points strongly
toward exclusion. How does one balance these directly conflicting
assessments? Without diminishing the important negative impact on the
appellant’s legitimate privacy interests occasioned by the unreasonable
search, I find compelling the argument that the exclusion of reliable
crucial evidence in circumstances where the propriety of the police
conduct stands unchallenged would, viewed reasonably and from a
long-term perspective, have a negative effect on the repute of the
administration of justice.
Absent any claim of police misconduct or negligence in the
obtaining of the initial search warrant, and absent any attempt to go
behind the redacted information, it would be inappropriate to proceed
on any basis other than that the police conducted themselves in
accordance with the applicable legal rules. If there were a taint of
impropriety, or even inattention to constitutional standards, to be found
in the police conduct, that might well be enough to tip the scales in
favour of exclusion, given the very deleterious effect on the accused’s
legitimate privacy interests. I can see none. The evidence is admissible
under the approach to s. 24(2) set out in Grant.175

Blake suggests that even when a privilege-redacted search warrant
information is vulnerable to a facial attack, defence counsel will now be
well advised to attempt a further sub-facial attack in order to rebut the
inference of police good faith, even though it will often be extremely
difficult to identify any concrete basis for such an attack in a case where
172
173
174
175
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the underlying facts are shielded behind a virtually impregnable wall of
confidential informant privilege.176 When the good faith of the police
cannot be impugned, courts are likely to treat the second and third Grant
factors as balancing out and decide cases on the basis that the first Grant
factor favours admission.
Although post-Grant decisions in which the police are found to have
acted in good faith have generally resulted in unconstitutionally obtained
“real” evidence being admitted177 (with some exceptions178), evidence has
often been excluded when the police have been found to have violated the
Charter deliberately or negligently, or displayed an unreasonable ignorance
of their Charter obligations.179 Morelli, discussed above, is one such case.
A further example is R. v. Sandhu,180 where Quigley J. of the Ontario Superior Court excluded a very large amount of cocaine seized from a
tractor-trailer — 205 kilograms, almost six times larger than the quantity at
issue in Harrison — after finding that the police knew they were violating
the Charter but went ahead and searched the truck anyway. In several other
cases courts have followed Morelli and excluded evidence when a search
warrant has been obtained on the strength of a carelessly drafted, misleading or materially incomplete information to obtain, even when the errors
and omissions are not found to have been deliberate.181
However, the Grant section 24(2) test gives trial judges considerable
discretion, and the Grant majority repeatedly emphasizes that trial deci176

See, e.g., R. v. Leipert, [1997] S.C.J. No. 14, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 281 (S.C.C.).
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sions should be given “considerable” appellate deference.182 The Grant
framework is sufficiently flexible to permit trial judges to admit evidence
even in the face of police carelessness, or worse. This point is well illustrated by a recent Ontario trial decision, R. v. Little.183 The defendant’s
employer gave the police permission to go to the defendant’s workplace
desk and seize his work computer. While doing so, however, they looked
in a closed envelope on the defendant’s desk and seized personal photographs. They subsequently obtained a warrant to search the computer
hard drive, but delayed actually conducting the search until after the warrant had expired, and searched for items not covered by the warrant.
Justice Fuerst of the Ontario Superior Court excluded the seized photographs, finding that the police had acted “recklessly” by opening the
envelope with neither a search warrant nor Little’s consent. However, she
admitted the evidence from the computer, even though she found that the
police had acted “carelessly” and “recklessly” when conducting the
computer search. She distinguished the photographs from the computer
evidence on the grounds that the defendant’s privacy interest in the hard
drive of his workplace computer was “at the lowest end of the scale”.184
Further, she relied on the fact that the excluded photographs were not
central to the Crown’s case, whereas the computer evidence was “critical” to the prosecution, which involved extremely serious charges (two
counts of first degree murder).185
While it is impossible to be certain how these cases would have been
decided under the old Collins/Stillman framework, the post-Grant jurisprudence suggests that renewed emphasis is being placed on the
significance of police misconduct, and that courts are refraining from
treating the seriousness of the offence as a trump card guaranteeing admission. The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Morelli reaffirms
that even when there is no deliberate misconduct, police carelessness can
sometime tip the first set of Grant factors to favour exclusion. However,
Little serves as a reminder that the absence of police good faith will not
always serve as an automatic ticket to exclusion if the other Grant factors
are found to support admission, and that the seriousness of the underlying offence has not dropped entirely out of the analysis.186
182
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(c) Conclusions
In summary, while the new Grant section 24(2) framework allows
the Crown to secure the admission of much “conscriptive” evidence that
would have been excluded under the first branch of the Collins/Stillman
test, it also may help defence counsel to persuade trial judges to exclude
evidence when the police have demonstrated flagrant disregard for, or
ignorance of, the Charter. By trading certainty and predictability for
“flexibility”, the Court’s new test will have the practical effect of making
it more difficult for counsel on either side to predict the outcome of section 24(2) applications. This may lead to more Charter issues being
litigated, exacerbating the problem of overburdened trial lists and delay.
Finally, by placing even more discretionary power in the hands of trial
judges and emphasizing appellate deference, the Supreme Court’s new
test is likely to increase the disparity of outcomes between similar cases.
“Luck of the draw” at trial will become even more important.
The Court’s new section 24(2) test can also be criticized for downplaying the significance of exclusion as a remedy for a Charter violation.
According to the Grant majority, excluding evidence under section 24(2)
serves a purely societal purpose and is “not aimed at … providing compensation to the accused”.187 However, section 24 is expressly framed as
a remedial provision, suggesting that it has at least some corrective justice function.188 Indeed, the Court’s “standing” jurisprudence insists that
evidence can be excluded under section 24(2) only at the request of a
person who has suffered an infringement of his or her own personal
Charter rights, a restriction that makes no sense if exclusion is viewed as
entirely unrelated to the harm suffered by the claimant.189 Excluding unconstitutionally obtained evidence undeniably has compensatory effects
— in many cases, it restores the individual and the state to a position approximating that they would have occupied if the Charter had been
respected.190 Recognizing this effect as one of section 24(2)’s purposes is
that the degree of police misconduct outweighed by the minimal intrusiveness of the breach and the
reliability of the evidence).
187
Grant, supra, note 1, at para. 70.
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entirely consistent with the Grant majority’s wish to avoid “send[ing] the
message that individual rights count for little”. The practical reality in the
vast majority of criminal cases is that when section 24(2) exclusion is
refused, the violation of the accused’s Charter rights goes entirely unremedied. As McLachlin J. (as she then was) observed in R. v. Williams,
“[a] Charter right is meaningless, unless the accused is able to enforce
it”.191 If the justice system routinely denies persons whose rights have
been breached any compensation for the infringement, this must surely
send the message that “rights count for little”. It is unfortunate that the
Grant majority did not recognize this link and instead denied that section
24(2) serves any corrective justice purpose.
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